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Abstract 
This thesis examines the United States government’s official diplomatic recognition of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1933. I argue that in severing sixteen years of executive policy 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s personal leadership directly impacted recognition, aided by the 
involvement of his Soviet counterpart: Foreign Minister Maxim M. Litvinov. Their combined 
efforts formed a union of convenience which ensured diplomatic recognition, and a 
rapprochement to earlier hostility. FDR’s advisors began seriously discussing the possibility of 
recognizing the Marxist state in May 1932, although their actions were not made known until 
well after the March 1933 inauguration. Alternatively, Litvinov initiated a policy of “collective 
security” within the USSR that dovetailed succinctly with western machinations for international 
prosperity. Several milestones throughout Roosevelt’s first year in office were a direct result of 
the ultimately fruitful negotiations between him, the United States’ State Department, and 
Litvinov. The bitter impasse they arrived at, however, set the tone of US/Soviet diplomacy for 
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“If I could only, myself, talk to some one man representing Russians,” then president-
elect Franklin D. Roosevelt confidently quipped, “I could straighten out the whole question.”1 
Roosevelt as a foreign policy chieftain remains a conundrum to historians, particularly when 
juxtaposed against the “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” that was Joseph Stalin’s 
Russia.2 The rapprochement Roosevelt initiated between the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the early 1930s severed sixteen years of executive policy. 
The formal diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union in late 1933, however, stood apart as 
preeminently historically significant. This initiative occurred at the direct behest of Roosevelt 
and was solidified due to the efforts of both Foreign Minister Maxim M. Litvinov, and William 
C. Bullitt. FDR’s advisors seriously discussed the possibility of recognizing the Marxist state in 
May 1932, although their actions were not made known until well after his March 1933 
inauguration. The atmosphere of the early 1930s was undoubtedly conducive to such an 
undertaking, although Roosevelt had to first solidify public support. Such an endeavor was not as 
difficult as previously thought, owing to the United States being gripped by a worldwide 
depression, whilst the Soviet system appeared to have survived the economic malaise. 
                                                 
1 Donald G. Bishop, The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1965), 
11 [Hereafter cited as Bishop]; John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Crisis, 1928-38, 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), 21. Title taken directly from text: “Both Hull and Phillips suspected 
that part of the trouble lay in the desire of the Commissar [Litvinov], for purposes of prestige, to deal directly with 
Roosevelt. The only answer, if an agreement was to be achieved, lay in transferring the talks to the White House. 
The President agreed to undertake the task and Secretary Hull arranged to bring Litvinov to see him on the following 
day.” Robert P. Browder, “The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Comintern, 1933-5,” The Russian Review 
12, no. 1 (January 1953), 27, [Hereafter cited as Browder-U.S., S.U., & C]. 
 
2 Direct quote of Sir Winston Churchill, found in Dennis J. Dunn, Caught Between Roosevelt & Stalin: 
America’s Ambassadors to Moscow, (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1998), ix, [Hereafter cited 
as Dunn].  
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Roosevelt’s motivation for reconciliation stemmed from a desire to aid in increasing 
opportunities to forestall the U.S. economic depression. Alternatively, Litvinov’s impetus was to 
further cement “collective security” within the Soviet Union and abroad, which dovetailed 
succinctly with western machinations of international prosperity. Individually, both men’s 
previous efforts bore fruit, but it was their combined efforts in 1933 that personally made 
recognition not only possible, but inevitable. These events depict a multi-faceted quagmire 
wherein the tenuously changing diplomatic intrigue which simultaneously occurred throughout 
Europe and the United States produced the perfect environment for U.S. and Soviet commonality 
through mutually beneficial diplomatic relations. The wealth of primary source material 
published by U.S. governmental offices showcased Roosevelt’s involvement throughout the 
convoluted process, continually frustrated due to his executive predecessors’ foreign policy 
blunders, and a pervasive fear of Bolshevism among political elites.  
The genesis of this work is bolstered by a brief overview of international relations 
historiography relative to the larger cold war milieu during the early to mid-twentieth century, 
significant in its extensive indictment of the primary governmental parties. The climax of 
historiographical discourse is the introduction of pericentrism, a dynamic hypothesis which 
included not only fault levied against both the United States and Soviet Union, but also 
incorporated larger foreign relations dynamics amongst smaller states who sought to take 
advantage of bi-polar conflict. A chronicle of estrangement between the U.S. and Soviet Union 
from 1917–32 further highlight this chapter, as well as a synopsis of the respective presidential 
administrations between revolution and recognition. Understanding the stalwart positions of 
American politicians refusing recognition on the grounds of the faulty foreign policy decisions of 
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Woodrow Wilson, Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover is extremely useful 
to solidify the reader’s appropriate historical context. 
As with any historical examination, it is necessary to define specific terminology. For the 
purposes of this thesis, chapter two discusses key verbiage relative to the dictates of how 
international law perceives recognition, and conversely – its ensuing responsibilities and 
expectations to all entities involved. This relationship is further complicated owing to the 
revolutionary change of government experienced, as opposed to the traditional constitutional 
format of transferring governmental rule. A discussion of significant international events further 
endow the reader with a greater understanding of pressing concerns necessary to grasp such a 
delicate international balance of power: the early-1930s global economic depression, the rise of 
fascism in Germany and militarism in Japan, Stalin’s first “Five Year Plan,” and the Comintern’s 
influence within the US – whether legitimate or imagined.   
Building on chapter two’s explanation of the dire state of affairs in international relations, 
chapter three is instrumental in providing a concise examination of the delicate steps which 
composed recognition’s prelude. Confident in his constitutional authority, Roosevelt “greased 
the wheels” toward recognition so as not to disturb his constituency, or those in the State 
Department. An examination of controversial actions conducted by FDR which may have 
effectually levied de facto recognition is also included which ultimately culminated in an official 
invitation to Soviet President Mikhail Kalinin, asking him to send a diplomat to DC to begin 
negotiations on 10 October 1933.3 Specific talks took place between representatives of both 
                                                 
3 George McJimsey, general editor. Documentary History of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency, Vol. 27: 
The Recognition of the Soviet Union (LexisNexis, 2006), 312 [Hereafter cited as McJimsey]. Michael Cassella-
Blackburn, The Donkey, the Carrot, and the Club: William C. Bullitt and Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1948, 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 99 [Hereafter cited as Cassella-Blackburn]; Robert E. Bowers, “Hull, 
Russian Supervision in Cuba, and Recognition of the USSR,” Journal of American History 52, no. 3 (December 
1966): 542-555 [Hereafter cited as Bowers-Hull, Russian Subversion] ; “President Roosevelt to the President of the 
Soviet All-Union Central Executive Committee (Kalinin),” 10 October 1933,  Foreign Relations of the United 
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governments on three separate occasions and locations during 1932-3 foreshadow chapter four’s 
record of convoluted relationships between FDR and the State Department which occurred 
simultaneous to FDR’s clandestine statesmanship above. More specifically this key thesis 
installment expounds on three primary impediments espoused with vigor by anti-recognition 
representatives: restitution of the “Kerensky Debt,” protection of the religious and legal rights of 
Americans in Russia, and a guarantee for the cessation of Comintern interference/propaganda 
efforts on US soil.   
Chapter five chronicles the diplomatic negotiations in their entirety, and intensive 
discussions between Litvinov, Bullitt, and Roosevelt from 7 – 16 November 1933 which 
constituted the bulk of the recognition efforts. Absent the presence of stenographers, no complete 
record exists of the exchanges that took place. The bulk of information available regarding these 
meetings must therefore be pieced together.4 Although charged with their promulgation, Bullitt 
ultimately called on FDR’s help in solidifying American aims, and it is Roosevelt’s direct 
involvement that allowed the talks to bear fruit. The final terms of recognition were agreed upon, 
however, the delicate issue of unresolved debt negotiations masked by a “gentleman’s 
agreement” to settle financial dictates the following calendar year proved its undoing. The 
subsequent and long lasting effects on U.S. – Soviet relations which arose from the diplomatic 
ramifications of these unanswered questions provided fertile soil for the formal Cold War period. 
Relevant international relations theories and the significance of recognition on international 
political events ultimately ground this analysis, and provide legitimation to the actions discussed.  
                                                 
States: The Soviet Union, 1933-9, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), 17-8 [Hereafter cited as 
FRUS-SU]. 
 
4 Bishop, 19 [*= “In the library at Hyde Park is a Memorandum for the Secretary of State, dated March 3, 
1934: “Mr. Kannee forwards envelope of miscellaneous papers and clippings re Litvinoff conferences and states that 
these were left on the mantle in Mr. McIntyre’s room during the conferences. Mr. Kannee states that he put them in 
Mr. McIntyre’s desk and called them to the attention of Mr. Bullitt who said, “leave them there, they are not 
important.” (Roosevelt Papers, Official File, Box 799, RL.)]. 
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Chapter 1. Historical Context of Pre-Second World War International Relations and an 
Analysis of Related Historiography 
 
 The installation of international affairs as the dominant force in American politics 
propelled geographically insulated Americans to delve into nation building, set about peaceful 
commercial expansion, and practice political noninvolvement in the affairs of others. 
Conversely, European statesmen continued to barter away other nations’ real estate in order to 
maintain a fluctuating balance of power. Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in November 
1917, United States businessmen circumvented official governmental policy and organized a 
profitable trade relationship with the Soviet Union through the offices of the American Trading 
Corporation (Amtorg) – Moscow’s eager representative which sought American technology and 
capital. In 1925, Amtorg proved so successful that ten percent of all Ford Motor Company 
tractors were purchased by Soviet buyers, who also acquired American-manufactured 
locomotives in bulk. By 1930, Soviet-U.S. trade reached a $100 million annual value, doubling 
figures prior to 1914. Although concern existed that the Soviets may dump cheap products in 
American markets, growing optimism among entrepreneurs foresaw lucrative business 
exchanges with the Soviet Union, especially following the 1929 stock market crash and the 
potential of Russian commerce aiding in the overall U.S. economic recovery.  
Combined with nearly a century of historical hindsight, extensive Roosevelt research 
published during past decades provide a nuanced, balanced portrait of the commander-in-chief 
and the controversial events which culminated in recognition. Recent scholarship tossed out 
claims of appeasement and conspiracy, and further repudiated declarations of his extraordinarily 
perceptive and prophetic abilities as an enormously skilled executive. For example, the author 
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Justus D. Doenecke critically conceded FDR so ably made recognition possible that he deserved 
to be titled the architect of U.S.-Soviet relations. Conversely, Mark A. Stoler unashamedly 
pronounced Roosevelt was imbued with a litany of faults, including a “deviousness and selective 
morality” which established “dangerous precedents and had tragic consequences.”5 The subject 
at hand, however, required a macro estimation of recognition’s place within the larger landscape 
of Cold War historiography, not merely a reflection of publications which delved into the picked 
over campaigns of the wheelchair bound executive. While both cumbersome and clumsily 
overlapping, diplomatic historiography provided fertile soil for a successful analysis of the 
prodigious amount of research available. The Cold War’s complicated milieu is rightly ascribed 
“the most studied and curious in modern history”; as such, each publication consulted attempted 
to distinguish reality and illusion, and included some distinction as to what aspect of U.S. – 
Soviet relations were adjudicated.6  
The first interpretations of hostility fomented between the U.S. and Soviet Union were 
heavily influenced by the assertion that the cause of hostilities rested solely on the Reds’ 
perceived expansive foreign policy aims. This vantage, known interchangeably as 
“traditionalism” or “orthodoxy,” clearly prosecuted the Soviet Union as having radically altered 
the “spheres of influence” status quo and compelled America to counter its advance.7 Typified 
by “diplomats turned historians,” many leading scholars who inaugurated this premature 
                                                 
5 Justus D. Doenecke and Mark A. Stoler, Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Foreign Policies, 1933-45, 
(New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 2 [Hereafter cited as Doenecke]. 
 
6 Timothy J. White, “Cold War Historiography: New Evidence Behind Traditional Typographies,” 
International Social Science Review 75 (Fall 2000): 42. [Hereafter cited as White]; Ronn Pineo, “Recent Cold War 
Studies,” The History Teacher 37 (November 2003): 85. [Hereafter cited as Pineo]. 
 
7 Pineo, 82. Note: It should be understood that the term traditionalist is interchangeably used with the term 




examination of international relations were former members of the American administrations 
who witnessed its formation. 8 Via unrestricted access to personal conversations and documents, 
this ideological construction was heavily inspired by the respected opinions of George F. 
Kennan, then serving as an American advisor in Moscow. Writing under the pseudonym “Mr. 
X,” Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” (1947) borrowed heavily from earlier 
containment theories which dated back to the Wilson administration.9 The ensuing 
announcement of the Truman Doctrine as a perceived necessary response to Soviet aggression 
undergirded American military and diplomatic policies for decades thereafter. Kennan’s 
involvement, is further prescient because he is one of the only authors included here actually 
present at the meetings which installed recognition in 1933. Although he lent “a very minor hand 
in the preparation of the briefing papers for the American negotiators,” his involvement with the 
discussions in Washington play a significant role in later summations and disenfranchisement 
with Soviet dealings.10 His nuanced representation of America’s historical foreign relations as 
designed to elicit social, commercial, and cultural bonds further showcase a successful 
promotion of the American international agenda. He balanced this assertion by pointing out the 
United States’ prosperity was a result of its largely peaceful history, insulated by weak 
geographical neighbors to the north and south – to which Kennan contrasted Russia’s centuries 
of regional conflict dominated by either invasive wars, their preparations, or the distracting 
diplomacy left in their wake. During bouts of relative peace, Slavic leaders were thus unable to 
                                                 
8 Edward Crapol, “Some Reflections on the Historiography of the Cold War,” The History  
Teacher 20, no. 2 (February 1987): 254. [Hereafter cited as Crapol]. 
 
9 Mr. X [George F. Kennan], “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 566-582; 
Kennan composed this treatise under a pseudonym, the purpose of which is not entirely clear in the research 
included for this paper. 
 
10 George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), 58, [Hereafter cited as 
Kennan – Memoirs]. 
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fortify infrastructure and culture, but instead contended with powerful continental rivals who 
continually sought to diplomatically maneuver their advantageous positions without a modicum 
of deference to Russia’s welfare. The divergence in approach toward international relations by 
Russia and America was therefore significant to Kennan’s worldview and writings, and 
prompted him to adopt the conservative viewpoint that Russia must be dealt with in a firm, 
consistent manner along a reasonably static course.      
Built on Kennan’s earlier theses, the quintessential work which introduced the formal 
traditionalist approach was Herbert Feis’s Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and 
the Peace They Sought (1957), naively heralded as the preeminent monograph on the subject 
only a year after its release.11 Finding “neither fools nor traitors” in the ranks of the American 
government, traditionalism’s founding set the stage for an overriding sense of universalism and 
commonality between nations who shared a vested interest in world affairs.12 Observing the 
difficulty in obtaining information to bolster his research, Feis cleverly referred to the “hoarded 
documents” of public figures whose “reputations are surrounded by a moat for a generation”; the 
most titular of which being Kennan’s later two-volume works: Soviet American Relations, 1917-
1920, Volume I: Russia Leaves the War (1956), and Soviet American Relations, 1917-1920, 
Volume II: The Decision to Intervene (1958). 13 Kennan’s recollection of events long forgotten is 
more akin to a Greek epic in its rambling dictation and personified the traditionalist gospel. 
Lastly, no examination of the traditionalist camp would be complete without referring to the 
                                                 
11 Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 655; B.H.M. Vlekke, “Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and 
the Peace They Sought” by Herbert Feis,” Pacific Affairs 31(December 1958): 401. 
 
12 S. Everett Gleason, “Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought” by 
Herbert Feis,” Political Science Quarterly 72 (December 1957): 610; Crapol, 253.  
 
13 Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: W.W.  
Norton & Company, Inc., 1970), x. [Hereafter cited as From Trust]. 
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works of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and their impact on the field. His article “Origins of the Cold 
War” (1967) described a “cumulative momentum” of American might matching Soviet treachery 
in Europe as an ordained “crusade for international freedom,” concealed within an “implacable 
struggle.”14 Schlesinger opportunistically took up the mantle of defending traditionalism, and 
curiously argued “the Soviet Union was not a traditional national state,” and maliciously attacked 
historians who did not agree with his contentious agenda.15 
Most often applied to the domain of foreign policy, “revisionism” provided a logical 
antithesis to traditionalism. Distinguished by an “impurity of American motives,” revisionism 
asserted the plausibility that the Soviets possessed sufficient cause to act the way they did due to 
America’s pervasive foreign policy encroachments.16 A widespread reevaluation of the United 
States’ role in international affairs was therefore necessary to understand leading historical 
scholars, and their impetus for espousing controversial arguments about who was actually at fault 
for the conflict’s proliferation. This scrutiny gained valuable incitement with the pervading 
corporatism of the day and high cost of readily identifiable military conflicts. Previously, 
traditionalists sought to justify their claims by excusing previous administrations’ deplorable 
actions. Their camp highlighted the preconception that America’s formative inception arose 
during “an age of empires as part of an empire,” which supposedly established precedence for 
their descendants to reconcile democratic republicanism with a lucrative imperial foreign 
                                                 
14 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “Origins of the Cold War: The Russian Revolution – Fifty Years  
After,” Foreign Affairs 46, no. 1 (1967): 45. [Hereafter cited as Schlesinger]; Schlesinger, 22; Charles Seymour, 
“Foreign Affairs: Woodrow Wilson in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs 34 (January 1956): 178. 
 
15 Schlesinger, 46. 
 
16 Paul Seabury, “Cold War Origins, I.” Journal of Contemporary History 3, no. 1 (January 1968): 169. 




policy.17 Consistently credited as one of the “doyens of revisionism, on chronological grounds 
alone,” William Appleman Williams’ The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959) presaged the 
age of revisionism and served as a voice in the wilderness regarding American foreign policy. 18 
He originated the assertion that the U.S. craved the implementation of “an economic, political, 
and ideological agenda” in order to construct a purely western focused century.19 Williams 
admirably distinguished himself by challenging historians “to apply the past tense to certain of 
our attitudes” and honestly reflect on the end goals of commanding an international presence.20 
Williams’ other less notable revisionist writing was The Roots of the Modern American Empire 
(1969), preceded by other popular monographs which complete pantheon of the “New Left,” 
such as D.F. Fleming’s The Cold War and Its Origins (1961), which argued Soviet actions could 
be rationally explained or justified in light of its own nationalistic interests.21  
Another less obvious prognosticator of revisionism, was Maxim Litvinov himself, with 
the disappointing 1955 publication of his Notes for a Journal. Although published in the United 
States two years after Stalin’s death, Litvinov’s perspective is staunchly Stalinist. E.H. Carr’s 
introduction to the work confided to the reader that extensive passages of the work were 
refurbished or wholly invented in order to increase the book’s appeal to a wider audience. Carr 
supposed “at least two hands have been at work” on the materials included.22 Serious passages, 
                                                 
17 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: The World Publishing 
Company, 1959), 25. [Hereafter cited as Williams]. 
18 Michael Leigh, “Is There a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War?” Political Science 
Quarterly 89 (March 1974): 104. 
 
19 Crapol, 254-255. 
 
20 Williams, 20. 
 
21 Seabury, 170. 
 
22 Maxim Litvinov, Notes for a Journal (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1955), 14, 
[Hereafter cited as Litvinov]. 
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whether legitimately ascribed to Litvinov or invented by later public affairs representatives, 
dominated the book’s early sections. Later inscriptions appear to be those of a “gossip-writer” 
and become ever more prominent; its final sections almost exclusively not the accurate 
reflections of the politically exiled foreign minister. 
The third and arguably most significantly impactful school of thought did not necessarily 
discredit previous academic assemblies, but instead attributed blame to both transgressors 
equally.23 A familiar face emerged when researching its beginnings – that of noted historian, 
John Lewis Gaddis and his landmark The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-
1947 (1972). Gaddis explained the behind-the-scenes semantics over what label to use as a 
characterization of this new field – variously alternating from “neoorthodoxy,” “eclecticism,” 
and finally “post-revisionism” – the latter term ultimately crystallized as the epithet used in 
practice.24 Although initially active in the formation of the traditionalist discipline, Gaddis’ 
groundbreaking work in tandem with his tirelessly passionate scholarship on the subject, earned 
him the ominous title: “father of post-revisionism.” In spite of his consistently superior 
understanding of the Cold War, buttressed with an august and methodological sophistication, 
Gaddis is also the first to literally capitalize the term: forging its place in the public 
consciousness not merely as a cold war, but by a new identification as the Cold War.25 Further, 
what is most striking is Gaddis’s revelation that “not one of the New Left revisionists was a 
                                                 
23 Ellen Shrecker, editor, Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism 
(New York: The New Press, 2004), 71. [Hereafter cited as Shrecker]. 
 
24 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Postrevisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the cold War,” 
Diplomatic History 7 (1983): 172. [Hereafter cited as Postrevisionist Synthesis]. 
 
25 Shrecker, 53; Note: The assertion of Gaddis’s capitalization is in reference to his The United States and 




Soviet specialist” and even fewer of their number even spoke Russian.26 In all actuality, he also 
posited in Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretative History (1978) that 
the qualified number of “American experts on Russia … could have been counted on the fingers 
of one hand.”27 The most contentious element of his post-revisionist thesis harkened to the 
recognition accords’ initial debt negotiations. Gaddis posited American decision-makers 
approached their dealings with the Soviet Union from a position of weakness which stemmed 
from limitations inherent in the American economic system. American strategists were therefore 
convinced that capitalism’s survival required an unlimited overseas expansion of American 
economic influence, and thus unable to recognize legitimate Soviet interests abroad. 28   
Post-revisionism humbly accepted evidence cited by revisionists, although did not 
condone its conclusions, which forced its earliest critics to dismiss its prominence as 
“toothless.”29 Further, detractors point out post-revisionism’s failing to include philosophical 
texture, and a specific lacking of a clearly defined synthesis of its core tenets.30 Time and again, 
post-revisionists stalwartly asserted this new synthesis of Cold War historiography was much 
more than traditionalism “plus archives,” and fundamentally rejected classical interpretations of 
traditionalism and revisionism.31 Salvaging important landmarks of both camps by finally 
gaining necessary materials to vindicate themselves, post-revisionism absorbed previously 
                                                 
26 Postrevisionist Synthesis, 175. 
27 John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, The Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretative History, (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1978), 59. [Hereafter cited as An Interpretative History]. 
 
28 Leigh, 103-4 [quote: John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 
(New York, 1972), 357. 
 
29 Crapol, 258. 
 
30 Crapol, 259. 
 




inaccessible documents which confirmed a multitude of key traditionalist discourses. 32 Greater 
insight was paid as to the Cold War’s duality than a probe of malfeasance for its beginning or 
ending – these historians believed the Cold War was not only the result of predictable tensions in 
a bipolar system, but key players’ firmly held suspicions of one another had previously been 
established informally for generations. Ronald E. Powaski’s The Cold War: The United States 
and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991 (1998) agreed that conflict was indeed inevitable, due in large 
part to the striking incompatibility of the two nations’ ideological underpinnings.33 Powaski 
elaborated further that both were expansionist in their respective spheres of interest, and would 
have eventually extended their purview globally.34 The Cold War being “unavoidable” has 
obviously been a common thread throughout its rich scholarship, as echoed by both Isaac 
Deutscher’s Ironies of History (1966), and Paul Seabury’s foreknowledge of its overdue arrival 
still waiting “to be written” in his “Cold War Origins, I” (1968).35 
Donald G. Bishop’s The Roosevelt-Litvinov Agreements, published in 1965, added to the 
post-revisionist studies on the implementation of commitments made by both the United States 
and Soviet Union, respectively. While the first chapter concerned the lead-up to recognition and 
the related Washington negotiations, each subsequent chapter dealt with the specific 
implementation – or lack thereof – of each of the accords’ provisions. Difficulties which 
stemmed from the fulfillment of the November 1933 agreements were its chief concern, as well 
as how the American government believed the Soviets honored initial promises, specifically 
because the popular response within the United States was that Soviet commitments were always 
                                                 
32 Couvares, 257.    
33 Powaski, 1. 
 
34 Powaski, 2. 
 
35 Seabury, 178, 182. 
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ruptured when no longer beneficial. Bishop’s work sought to discover how truthful such a 
position was as it related to recognition, and ultimately disproved such a monochromatic 
aggrandizement of Soviet intentions.  
Prominent advocates of post-revisionism include George Herring’s Aid to Russia, 1941-
1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Origins of the Cold War (1973), and most especially, 
Gaddis’s own We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (1997). The latter writing directly 
challenged Williams’ revisionist assertions regarding America’s empire building, and prolifically 
espoused “the American empire arose primarily, therefore, not from internal causes, as had the 
Soviet empire, but from a perceived external danger powerful enough to overcome American 
isolationism.”36 Edited by Ellen Schrecker, Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History after 
the Fall of Communism (2004) retroactively ushered in a new American cultural recognition. 
Schrecker also identified “the self-conscious cult of toughness” associated with this era of 
statesmanship, and the propensity of decision-makers to look or walk away from the cruel 
aftermath of their behavior, which obligated future historian’s to judge policy-makers “less by … 
the purity of their motives than by the consequences of their actions.”37  
This work has already described Walter LaFeber’s 1972 challenge of William A. 
Williams’ earlier thesis, which claimed both the U.S. & Soviet Union sought to expand their 
predominance to regions most dramatically positioned to serve their economic interests.38 With 
this postulation, it is necessary to outline the second metastasis to post-revisionism as 
exemplified by a refreshing thesis which served as a “middle road.” “Realism” established the 
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premise that power structures and external pressures within international relations “shape and 
determine the behavior of states.”39 Realists denote that both the United States and Soviet Union 
were essentially empires at their core, therefore, their actions proved they each acted in their 
respective best interests – perfectly normal behavior given the circumstances. Employing the 
broad definition of realpolitik which identified “long-term national interests and the power 
politics deployed to defend and promote them,” realists provided a necessary bridge for post-
revisionism to its applicable undertones within today’s society.40 This shift highlighted far 
reaching trends inherent in modern foreign policy, specifically the tutelage of determined and 
decisive leaders. Interestingly, this bohemian vision assigned “blame for the Cold War either to 
both sides or, more accurately, to neither.”41 The practical response to relativism was then a call 
for historicism, particularly the recognition that there will always be varying definitions of 
correct interpretations, so long as they pass the “test of plausibility.”42  
This impasse within Cold War historiography allowed “pericentrism” to enter the fray on 
the side of realists and synthesized traditionalism, revisionism, and post-revisionism, to provide a 
re-examination of the conflict’s global implications.43 Reconsidering the influence of “junior 
members in the international system” – formerly viewed as pawns during the rivalry – 
pericentrism offered a “fundamental contribution … to the making of history” which utilized the 
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availability of ideological crusades to further their own aims, short of all-out war.44 Tony Smith’s 
“New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War” (2000), 
convincingly and aggressively argued that fundamental features of this epic are only fully 
understood when viewing the governments of minor countries as occupying axiomatic 
quintessence in the overall character of the Cold War.45 Smith’s prolific work altered the 
previously held belief that the remaining countries in the antithetical twentieth century were 
manipulatively taken advantage of for purposes of expanding foreign policy exploits of that era’s 
primary combatants. While others claimed knowledge of why the conflict dragged on as long as 
it did, Smith clearly enunciates other states in the international structure were just as complicit as 
anyone in the capitols of Washington or Moscow. The periphery’s decorum in Cold War 
historiography is checkered by those seeking “to be rectified by a history of the struggle … 
feeding on and contributing to the central dynamics of the East-West contests,” especially 
poignant when considering that the Soviet Union was once such an amateur state fully expecting 
to take advantage of abhorrent international circumstances, and may well have provided a 
sufficient paragon for future subordinate reflections of themselves.46 Thus pericentrism not only 
redefined conventional traditionalist concepts of the Soviet Union’s expansionary tendency, but 
simultaneously criticized revisionism’s exaggeration of American imperialism for refusing to 
come to terms with how the U.S. was dragged in equal measure to being driven “into every 
corner of the globe.”47 Finally, pericentrism viewed post-revisionism as yet another futile lens to 
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view history for not fully comprehending the tendency of peripheral surrogates’ interests and 
























Chapter 2. Estrangement: U.S.-Soviet Relations Between Revolution and  
Recognition, 1917-32 
 
Woodrow Wilson to Herbert Hoover 
The origin of discontent between east and west went back much further than the 
breakdown of wartime alliances in the late 1940s. While an abundance of authors point to the 
mistrust exemplified by Catherine the Great’s unwillingness to recognize the newly independent 
American colonies following its Revolutionary War, an examination of hostility spanning back 
to the eighteenth century is not the intention of this work. The genesis of this thesis’ analysis was 
thus found rooted in the events which surrounded the 1917 Bolshevik seizure of power, and 
resultant disavowal by the west.48 Subsequent decades elapsed whilst the Soviets consolidated 
their dominance through civil war, domestic strife, and the transition of power from Vladimir 
Lenin to Joseph Stalin. The United States experienced similar circumstances during this period 
and by 1932 was deeply immersed in the Great Depression. The American public looked ahead 
to the inauguration of newly elected Franklin D. Roosevelt, without realizing the stupendously 
ill-advised foreign policy measures of the presidents and policy-makers which preceded his 
administration had forever sowed the seeds of discontent within the Soviet psyche.49  
                                                 
48 The implication of the Cold War’s far reaching origins preceding “the World War II era,” are found in 
Couvares, 246; it is also specifically linked to “sentiments dating from 1917…” in Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-
American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1973), 260. [Hereafter cited as Paterson]; further, Stalin’s later suspicions regarding 
American foreign policy being “traced to this period,” can be found in Powaski, 34. [Hereafter cited as Powaski]; 
lastly, “the Siberian intervention was a harbinger of things to come,” is explicitly chronicled in Carl J. Richard, 
When the United States Invaded Russia: Woodrow Wilson’s Siberian Disaster, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2013), ix. [Hereafter cited as Richard]. 
 
49 Norman E. Saul, Friends or Foes?: The United States and Soviet Russia, 1921-1941 (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 2006), 5.  
23 
 
Spanning three successive Republican administrations, non-diplomatic recognition of the 
Soviet Union was a basic ingredient of American foreign policy, however, the decision was 
initially solidified under Woodrow Wilson’s democratic administration. In the midst of the 
crippling series of events which served as a prologue to the most abhorrent century in mankind’s 
tenure, one must recognize President Wilson’s intentions were not always to “repair the 
potentially fatal international defects of modern industrial civilization[s].”50 Incidentally, he 
regarded the Bolshevik government “as a demonic conspiracy” which destroyed the “democratic 
promise” inside Russia.51 While it is true the president strove to provide equitable freedom for 
the world’s poor and distressed, he alone ascertained whether they chose freedom accordingly. 
Once it was determined the nation in question had not met his high standards, Wilson deployed 
U.S. muscle to “force reality into correspondence with his imagery and ideals.”52  
Events “limit the capacity of the statesman to bend history to his will,” although there is 
perhaps no person in American history that strove to bend history to his own will more, than the 
twenty-eighth president of the United States.53 Convening seven separate foreign military 
interventions during his two terms as president – a record thankfully unbroken by successors – 
made Wilson’s governance quite remarkable indeed.54 American participation in Allied efforts to 
control Russia’s ever changing political landscape “differed in style and form” from the Wilson 
administration’s previous foreign interventions, and confirmed the American president “was 
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dragged into the Russian imbroglio at the insistence of his allies.”55 Wilson’s disturbingly vague 
yet grand promises of perpetual peace, “contributed to the somnipathy of liberalism,” of which it 
never fully recovered.56 Wilson’s willingness to fully commit America’s resources – most 
especially the military – particularly because international events allowed him greater 
opportunities to do so, enabled him to convert the language of foreign policy to coincide with his 
domestic ideology.57 The U.S. government perceived Soviet practices and ideology antithetical 
to the American way of life, therefore official diplomatic recognition was inconceivable. 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing’s 15 December 1917 memorandum specifically forbade 
American diplomatic representatives in Europe and the Far East from having any official 
relations with Russian diplomatic deputies recognized or appointed by the Soviet government. 
This watershed event established a firm non-recognition policy, variously justified by successors 
thereafter, yet always upheld by the U.S. government for a further sixteen years. Paradoxically, 
military attaché to Russia and Brigadier-General W.V. Judson insisted from the outset the Soviet 
establishment comprised a de facto government, and thus relations should be established. In 
answer to his advocacy, General Judson was specifically directed by President Wilson to refuse 
“direct communication with the Bolshevik government” – an implied admission that the Soviet 
regime did in fact constitute a defined government.58 
This undercurrent of U.S.-Soviet studies showcased the minority opinion that the Cold 
War encompassed two separate phases exemplified by hostile policies of American Presidents 
Woodrow Wilson and Harry S. Truman, respectively. The first commenced with the ineffectual 
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March 1918 military interventions at Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok, which occurred 
because the president did not consider the Soviet state as representative of the Russian people’s 
will. 59 Wilson’s interference in Russia’s internal affairs continued until fall 1919 – effectually 
ended by his tour of western American states advocating for the Treaty of Versailles and the 
League of Nations – thus halting his active participation in American governmental proceedings 
and providing Secretary of State Lansing an avenue to formulate foreign policy. Although 
American forces remained in Russia until 1920, Lansing eventually ascertained it was not likely 
to topple the Russian authoritarian regime solely with force, and instead sought a gradual 
undermining of their legitimacy to pave the way for future dealings. Lansing’s eventual exit from 
the Washington political landscape made possible Bainbridge Colby’s appointment as Secretary 
of State, who wasted no time in marshalling new contentions against recognition. Colby recoiled 
at the dismemberment of Russia and dictated that all questions of sovereignty for the former 
tsarist empire’s territories be tabled until Russia was no longer in the throes of a non-
representative government. Further, lacking any formal political experience with which to draw 
from, Colby examined the Soviet government and justified his perspective in a 10 August 1920 
note to Italian ambassador Baron Camillo Romano Avezzana: 
We cannot recognize, hold official relations with, or give friendly reception to the 
agents of a government which is determined and bound to conspire against our 
institutions; whose diplomats will be the agitators of dangerous revolt; whose 
spokesman say that they sign agreements with no intention of keeping them.60  
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At the time of this critical writing President Wilson was incapacitated from a stroke and 
unfortunately never indicated any disagreement with Colby’s staunch anti-Soviet policy. 
Domestically, the United States was left reeling from the First Red Scare wherein Attorney 
General A. Mitchell Palmer campaigned against dissenters of socialist orientation, culminating in 
mass arrests and deportations. Unscathed by their actions, the American government soon forgot 
the Allied intervention; the Soviets did not, and held fast to their bitter discontent. Diplomats in 
the U.S. Foreign Services and military officers who served in the American Expeditionary 
Forces during this time were similarly marked by their experiences, and developed strong 
characterizations regarding not only the Russian regime’s governance, but also the disposition 
the U.S. should undertake toward it.  
Those who favored closer ties with the Soviet republic were cautiously optimistic after 
Warren G. Harding’s November 1920 landslide victory because his campaign platform 
championed trade restoration with nations at peace with the United States. The twenty-ninth 
president’s intentions were soon overshadowed, however, by influential cabinet members led by 
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Clark Hoover. A 
New York Times article boasted on 25 March 1921 they were “unable to discover that a single 
member of President Harding’s Cabinet is at this time in favor or recognition of Soviet Russia or 
direct dealings with that regime.”61 According to White House’s conservative bastions, the 
Bolshevik regime’s dissemination of revolutionary propaganda, nationalization of foreign-owned 
property, and most significantly the repudiation of international debt, justified economic and 
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diplomatic isolation. Likewise, a mere four months in office, President Coolidge’s 4 December 
1923 address to Congress superseded the previous Lansing-Colby doctrine and outlined his 
brand of economic-legitimism:  
While the favor of American is not for sale, I am willing to make very large 
concessions for the purpose of rescuing the people of Russia. Already 
encouraging evidences of returning to the ancient ways of society can be detected. 
But more are needed. Whenever there appears any disposition to compensate our 
citizens who were despoiled, and to recognize that debt contracted with our 
Government not by the Czar [sic] but by the newly formed republic of Russia; 
whenever the active spirit of enmity to our institutions is abated; whenever there 
appear works meet for repentance, our country ought to be the first to go to the 
economic and moral rescue of Russia.62  
 
Fortunately for the Soviets, American business magnates still offered short and long-term 
financing options during the 1920s, and maintained a tenuous relationship which signified a 
transition in concern toward the more pointedly critical issue of propaganda. 
Installed in 1929, President Hoover’s administration contained an air of legitimacy owing 
to his prior humanitarian activities in Europe as Director of the American Relief Administration 
during and immediately after the First World War. In fact, it was Hoover’s 28 March 1919 report 
which vehemently compelled his Washington superiors to oppose further accommodations with 
Lenin and challenged, “we cannot ever remotely recognize this murderous tyranny without 
stimulating actionist radicalism in every country in Europe and without transgressing … every 
national ideal of our own.”63 Following inauguration, Hoover corroborated his earlier pretenses 
and declared long-term credits and communism were incompatible because “no one would trust 
men who repudiated debts and agreements whenever it suited them.”64 In spite of this staunch 
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perspective, his administration’s State Department learned of a series of upcoming wheat 
conferences between January 1930 and May 1931. The February 1931 “Second World Wheat 
Conference,” however, was selected to provide an environment necessary for natural stages 
toward recognition. Leftist journalist Louis Fischer further elucidated such a possibility, and as a 
result, his formulations were circulated within the State Department’s higher echelons and 
ultimately published in his 1931 Why Recognize Russia? Fischer confirmed the Soviets were 
ready to negotiate and further suggested:  
wheat could afford the occasion for diplomatic contacts between the Soviet and 
American governments. … A world wheat conference might … make for better 
pubic feeling toward Russia. Prominent personalities … would meet in quiet, 
serious, utilitarian discussion and perhaps pave the way to larger political 
pourparlers.65 
 
Fischer further intimated recognition would be expedited by a “courageous executive” actively 
involved in the negotiation process “simply … by making the announcement.”66 Hoover proved 
unwilling or unable to purse such a course of action, and the burden of wheat and recognition fell 
to his successor. Incidentally, Roosevelt’s later actions took the exact route initially put forth by 
Fischer – his close personal friend: 
Wipe the slate clean, and invite negotiators to settle outstanding problems and 
exchange mutual pledges. There is really nothing more to it. Indeed, the whole 
matter is so plain that one sometimes wonders why all the commotion and 
opposition.67  
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During a January 1933 meeting with outgoing Secretary of State Henry Stimson 
Roosevelt broached the subject of Soviet recognition. Stimson responded by explaining the 
reasons behind the standing non-recognition policy, but more significantly, asserted specific 
criteria he believed must be met before the Soviet Union’s recognition was possible.68 Hoover’s 
administration (and his Republican predecessors) convinced themselves the Soviet Union 
intended to foment worldwide revolution, a position bolstered by the nationalization of foreign 
nationals’ private property, and the refusal to pay its alleged war debts. Stimson’s chief concern 
was an assurance from the Soviet regime it would function within the “fundamental principle of 
the family of nations.”69 He earnestly believed that in surrendering even a small portion of 
America’s international moral standing by conducting relations with nations refusing to live 
according to international precedent, would in essence, undermine international liberalism.  
At this critical juncture, FDR comprehended that it was not whether the Soviets could 
gain recognition, but how; Fischer and Stimson alternatively provided him with the necessary 
blueprint to ensure success. In addition, several waves of sojourners to the Soviet Union fulfilled 
the role of midwife to this beneficial accord’s birth. The first wave embraced the thrill of it all, 
romantic revolutionaries – John Reed, Louise Bryant, Lincoln Steffens, and William C. Bullitt – 
who sought to persuade political representatives to transcend their apprehensions and welcome 
the workers’ paradise into the family of nations. Philanthropists followed in 1921, and provided 
food to the famine stricken regions of the Soviet Union, followed by an increasing number of 
educators, social workers, labor leaders, artists, social scientists, and businessmen. Eager to 
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identify with the languishing Soviet republic, these travelers conditioned their individual 
perception of reality and emphasized specific segments of Soviet society to protect their idyllic 
impulses. Frustrated by the complacent policies which spanned from Presidents Warren G. 
Harding to Herbert Hoover, Roosevelt changed this shortsighted delineation, particularly because 
of his sympathetic interest in the reds’ efforts toward social idealism, experimentalism, and 
social reconstruction – all of which closely akin to his own world outlook.    
Excepting the Wilson administration’s disastrous policies regarding post-tsarist Russia, 
the solidification of republican foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union primarily stemmed 
from: an expectation of halting revolutionary activity abroad, a willingness to honor financial 
obligations of previous governments, or provide restitution to American individuals and 
businesses for property nationalized during the revolution. Various State Department officials, 
Kennan included, were skeptical of this premise’s plausibility and labeled the Marxist state an 
unfit ally from the outset.70 Others, such as Senator William Borah actively campaigned for a 
reversal of the non-recognition platform; Borah himself introduced in the American Senate seven 
resolutions calling for the establishment of diplomatic relations between May 1922 and March 
1933.71 Interestingly, Litvinov in 1926, and Stalin in a 1 December 1930 New York Times 
interview, were open to paying a portion of the debt in question, so long as Soviet counterclaims 
were likewise considered, and the U.S. granted credits or loans in exchange.72  
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In consideration of these factors, Roosevelt was compelled to ford the U.S.-Soviet 
impasse, particularly because of Russia’s investment potential and trade opportunities present in 
a nation of 160 million people. Fortunately, the 1932 domestic-issue focused election procured 
Roosevelt one of the most lopsided victories in U.S. history. Carrying forty-two states in total – 
every state west and south of Pennsylvania – on 8 November 1932 Roosevelt amassed fifty-
seven percent of the popular vote, and 472 of 531 Electoral College members. His entrance into 
the White House, however, occurred during a period of immense international chaos caused by 
two bellicose foreign powers, and an American union addled by economic crisis. As a result, 
FDR sought formulated strategies to obtain American domestic and international security well 
before his tenure at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. To accomplish this feat, he identified a powerful 
ally; one with vast resources, a market ripe for economic proliferation, and desperately seeking 
legitimacy and validation in the international political arena. FDR was then forced to navigate 
international law and related precedencies, specifically the key detraction the Soviet regime’s 
violent confiscation of power was a priori illegal. This perspective formed an underlying 
foundation of the United States government and pervaded its attitude toward the Soviets; further 
developments necessary to corroborate or refute this reality remained elusive.  
The First Five Year Plan 
Bolstered by a limited arsenal, the impressive first decade of Bolshevik governance 
exploited rivalries within Europe and suppressed further economic, military, and diplomatic 
revolution within its sphere of influence. By 1924 the Soviets gained de jure recognition from 
every major European nation, and succeeded in solidifying a small portion of the foreign capital 
it desperately craved.73 These developments prompted Stalin to passionately declare in 1927, “let 
                                                 




them go to hell, all these liberal-pacifist philosophers with their sympathy for the U.S.S.R.”74 The 
persistent fear of renewed intervention, however, marred their fledgling success and highlighted 
a frustration at the revolution’s failure to breach Russia’s borders. As such, a dynamic re-tooling 
of Soviet foreign policy began, particularly the humbling challenge of reconciling two 
contradictory factors: a primal necessitation to spread revolution, while prosaically guaranteeing 
Russia’s own internal survival. Leon Trotsky’s theory of “Permanent Revolution” initially 
overcame this paradox and proffered the assumption Russia’s revolution was not secured until 
the threat of imperialist intervention was thwarted by an equally significant revolution within 
other industrialized western nations. Socialism’s establishment in agrarian Russia therefore 
depended upon economic and technical support from successful revolutions in other countries 
with already established infrastructures, who would in turn similarly elevate Russia to the same 
status. This persistent belief in an imminent revolution retarded the Bolsheviks’ ability to 
formulate effective foreign policy, especially because Commissar for Foreign Affairs Trotsky 
saw little cause to establish relations with capitalist nations whose fate was already foretold; he 
boasted “the victorious revolution would not bother seeking recognition from the representatives 
of capitalist diplomacy.”75  
The Soviets’ supposition that foreign relations and diplomatic recognition were 
superfluous was replaced in 1924 by a sober-minded re-evaluation of their need to reach a modus 
vivendi with the outside world. To the Bolsheviks’ chagrin, external capitalist powers never 
experienced a predicted worldwide revolution, which forced the Soviet Union to adopt a dual 
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foreign policy. Such a decision reconciled their revolutionary principles and established a modus 
operando for foreign affairs, manifested in the attainment of national security by cultivating 
diplomatic relations with the west, and simultaneously encouraging clandestine subversion or 
revolution when provisions appeared constructive. The 1929 financial panic presented a suitably 
chaotic milieu for this paradoxical system to flourish. Appeals to the free market’s natural laws 
appeared as renunciations of social responsibilities, and cynical masses reinforced ideological 
disillusionment amongst the intelligentsia: between democratic politics and dictatorial 
governance, between command and market economies, between liberal politics and communism 
or fascism. The countries of Europe’s heartland were still the primary actors on the international 
stage, particularly because of the global depression’s undermining of the United States’ domestic 
markets and interconnected foreign relationships. 1929 also witnessed the launch of Stalin’s first 
Five-Year Plan, which called for a massive restructuring of Russia’s industrialization and 
required significant technical assistance and machinery from the capitalist west. Although U.S. 
exports to the Soviet Union exceeded every other country’s, the amount represented just three 
percent of total U.S. exports; Soviet exports also expanded to obtain foreign capital to pay for 
these imports. President Roosevelt sought desperately to improve his nation’s economic locus, 
and needed business opportunities to alleviate sensitivity among American business officials. 
Stuart Chase accorded currency to the expression “A New Deal” in his 1932 book of the same 
title, however, five years prior he realized that Soviet reality was the newest reality for mankind 
– “Why,” said the author, “should Russians have all the fun of remaking a world?”76  
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This favorable outlook dissolved suddenly, at a time when the U.S. economy could least 
afford to lose a dominant trading partner; 1931 exports to the Soviet Union dipped to half those 
of the previous year. Further, in 1930 the United States supplied a quarter of Russia’s imports – a 
figure which steadily declined until it decreased to one-twentieth in 1932.77 During that year, a 
U.S. Commerce Department report responded to the Soviets’ rapid decrease in purchase of 
American imports, and sought to assess Russia’s finance and trade capabilities. The report found 
the Soviet economy possessed enormous potential when compared with its imperial predecessor, 
and U.S. exports to the Soviet Union actually “increased 233 percent as compared with 
American exports to pre-war Russia, [while] American imports from the Soviet Union have 
actually fallen off nearly 20 percent.”78 Exacerbated by “threats of embargoes and mendacious 
propaganda about conditions in the Soviet Union,” importation unfortunately declined rapidly 
from 1930-2 by sixty-one percent, which compelled the Soviets to place orders with other 
countries; the most disturbing of which being a 1930 sixty-two percent increase to Germany.79 
Contrasting the Commerce Department’s optimistic findings, a State Department report on trade 
cautioned little would change following potential recognition. According to this enunciation, if 
the Soviets obtained critical trade agreements they would neither remunerate their debts, nor end 
propaganda efforts. Politically, the Commerce report asserted the Soviet trade monopoly was an 
infinitely useful “weapon of political pressure,” yet according to State the Soviet leadership 
could “turn trade off and on like a water faucet, regardless of all conditions.”80 Commerce thus 
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dictated the Soviet government proved an excellent credit risk, while State argued the Soviets 
were already in default to German banks and required extensive credits – on overly generous 
terms – to dig themselves out. 
Aggressive Foreign Actors: Germany and Japan  
The global financial panic highlighted the Soviet market’s potential, central planning, and 
social and economic practices and forcibly shifted American liberals further to the left. 
Individual recognition advocates longed for a signal of America’s moral approval of the Soviet 
regime and encouraged the United States to court the burgeoning Soviet social experiment. The 
Soviets were not the only forces bent on altering the status quo, however, and the potential of 
another world war became all the more prescient with German fascism and Japanese militarism’s 
respective predatory machinations. Rapprochement between the United States and Soviet Union 
therefore possessed a critical security dimension for both nations, in restraining Japanese Far 
Eastern aggression and related border skirmishes along the Soviet border, along with the added 
benefit of slowing Hitler’s alteration of the European Versailles system. The Far Eastern 
situation further spiraled out of control with the 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, which 
directly threatened the Soviet Union’s hegemonic status in Outer Mongolia, specifically the 
Kremlin’s investment in the Chinese-Eastern Railway. This railroad forged a tenuous link 
through Manchuria, and connected the west to the vulnerable Russian port at Vladivostok. Stalin 
offered Tokyo a nonaggression pact and negotiations specifically related to the railroad, and 
blended firmness of will with conciliation when he turned to the issue of diplomatic recognition. 
During spring 1932 Moscow also turned to the U.S. as a potential source of support for opposing 
Japan’s expansion, via indirect appeals by the Soviet press and unofficial diplomatic channels.  
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Hitler’s fascist foreign policy likewise echoed imperial expansion, based upon a 
systematic vision of struggle to drive a contagious platform provided by the era’s emerging mass 
media opportunities. A critical facet of this drive toward ruinous world conflict was the covet for 
Lebensraum – which presented immutable geographical conflict with Germany’s neighbors – a 
fact well known to Stalin and his magnates who possessed a “specially translated Mein Kampf 
and [were] endlessly discussing the pros and cons of a German alliance.”81 The true impetus for 
changing Soviet foreign policy, however, occurred in “hungry thirty-three” as a result of Hitler’s 
victorious installation as chancellor.82 While the Soviet leadership attempted to make inroads 
with the Nazi government, Hitler rebuffed their overtures and forced the Kremlin to shift toward 
a policy of “collective security” to combat outside aggression. The Soviet Union never entirely 
abandoned efforts to elicit cooperation with Germany, although mistrust of its capitalist 
colleagues failing to come to its aid overshadowed fear of German expansionism. Tellingly, 
Moscow hedged its bets and signed a series of nonaggression pacts with multiple European 
nations in early 1930s: Lithuania (May 1931), Finland (January 1932), Latvia (February 1932), 
Estonia (May 1932), Poland (July 1932), and France (November 1932). Additionally, Soviet 
representatives attended disarmament talks held in Geneva during 1932, and concluded mutual 
assistance pacts with Czechoslovakia and France in May 1935.83   
The arduous task of implementing collective security ultimately fell to Litvinov because 
of his mastery of diplomatic intrigue, and possession of a realistic assessment of international 
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balance of power politics. Years later, noting his demotion from Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 
Litvinov pluckily inquired of Stalin, “does that mean you regard me as an Enemy of the People?” 
Stalin hesitated, then decreed “No, we don’t consider Papasha [Litvinov] an Enemy. Papasha’s 
an honest revolutionary.”84 This courageous outburst impressed the vozhd, who consistently just 
preserved the cosmopolitan curmudgeon, undoubtedly because Litvinov’s usefulness and 
respected status in the west remained self-evident. Normalizing relations with the United States 
obviously served the Soviet government’s best interests and became of preeminent importance, 
not to mention aid the propagation of paranoia used by Kremlin elite to allege encirclement by 
increasingly hostile imperialist states. To stem the tide of such a hostile environment, it became 
necessary to march toward the production of infrastructure, a missing component that would be 
vital to any potential future conflicts. Enter Stalin’s first “Five-Year Plan” – a massive internal 
readjustment which provided the master-key to every facet of Russian foreign and domestic 
policy after 1929.  
The gloomy outlook of the late-1920s produced a miasma of suspicion and pessimism in 
Moscow, with renewed and increasingly panicked warnings of imminent intervention by foreign 
powers. Stalin utilized this war scare to curb internal opposition, and prepared his people for the 
demanding sacrifices of industrialization and collectivization which lay ahead. At the very least, 
this transition was an admission of the dual policy’s failure, and paved the way for filling its void 
in Soviet domestic governance. Prior to Stalin’s consolidation of Russian leadership into an 
oligarchical dictatorship, a divergence in perspective amongst foreign communism was possible. 
By 1930, however, if one wished to remain a communist – they were required to be a Stalinist. 
This manufactured solidarity of purpose was combined with an inward conviction that a lengthy 
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peace period lay ahead, and provided the 1927-8 impetus for Soviet leadership to implement a 
sequence of momentous domestic policies which sought to transform the Soviet Union, in 
addition to the larger world communist campaign. Recognized as the most drastic attempt in 
modern European history to alter the economic and social structure of a nation within such a 
brief period of time, Soviet industrialization and collectivization involved compulsory conditions 
for its rural populations to transform their lives in nearly every respect. If the dual policy 
imploded and no threat of war existed, however, it was useless to coddle western public opinion; 
yet Hitler’s ascension to power continued to represent a tangible danger. Thus, appeasement of 
western liberal-pacifist’s became a singularly important component of Soviet foreign policy, in 
conjunction with the secondary aim of destroying European socialist offshoots un-aligned with 
Moscow. The great depression’s onset did not alter this elemental dynamic but instead renewed 
the communist parties’ militancy, and struck a different tone from the years 1921-7 wherein the 
Comintern’s expected seizure of power would be accomplished in a relatively brief period of 
time. Conversely, Stalinism viewed nationalism and nation-states as transient precepts within 
modern world history’s contextual understanding of Marxism. The Soviet Union, however, 
needed to behave as a nation in order to be welcomed into the family of nations, whilst still 
retaining Bolshevism’s radical propaganda and revolutionary apparatus. The plan’s primary 
objective demanded the attainment of specific parameters, although its finer details were the 
chief influence on international public opinion along with the resultant policies of capitalist 
states’ response to the Red Army’s military potential, and related economic effects of Russia’s 





The Communist International  
Established in 1919, the Communist International (Comintern) was established to direct 
communist movements throughout the world. Prior to 1928, European communist parties were 
financially and organizationally dependent on their Soviet host; that year, however, witnessed a 
swing in their slavish subjugation to the ruling party apparatus and its leader – the vozhd. By the 
1930s the Comintern was supremely under Stalin’s direct control, marching in lock-step with a 
militant rhetoric meant to counter the world’s economic depression. Simultaneously, Stalin 
intimated he was willing to negotiate with the United States in 1933 and reoriented his political 
construct toward cooperation with the west. The first Five Year Plan’s abhorrent side effects – 
the loss of millions of innocent lives due to crushing repression, man-made famine, extreme 
agricultural losses, and an overall decrease in the standard of living by nearly one quarter when 
compared to 1928 – were by then well known in the west.85 The U.S.S.R.’s communist party 
during this period was similarly completely overhauled, and evolved into a fully totalitarian 
formulation with Stalin’s defeat of Nikolai Bukarin’s “Right Opposition,” which removed any 
nucleus of leadership within the party to oppose his reign of terror. It was precisely this 
governmental structure which FDR hoped to facilitate favorable diplomatic relations. By 1931, 
U.S. diplomats in Poland and Romania reported directly to the State Department on the influx of 
refugees fleeing the Pale. Further, reporters and travelers personally apprised Chief of the 
Division of Eastern European Affairs, Robert F. Kelley, of food shortages and its accompanying 
litany or horrors: suicide, murder, and cannibalism, a pervasive network of informants, and 
summary executions of officials for “sabotage.” Roosevelt was similarly made aware of this 
genocide, although Kelley made only indirect mention of it in his official presentations to 
                                                 




Secretary of State Hull, and the president never referenced it in his official communications with 
Soviet representatives Litvinov or Kalinin. Historians forever fault FDR for not addressing these 
atrocities when communicating terms to his Slavic counterparts, or later recognition negotiations.  
Ending its Five Year Plan in 1932 – a year early – Litvinov’s spring 1933 speech to the 
Central Committee harkened “the greater our plans of development, the more rapid their pace, 
the greater is our interest in the preservation of peace.”86 Entitled “The Results of the First Five-
Year Plan,” Stalin’s own 7 January 1933 musings on its progress explained, 
The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to transfer our country, with its 
backward, and in part medieval, technology, on to the lines of new, modern 
technology. … to convert the U.S.S.R. from an agrarian and weak country, … 
into an industrial and powerful country, fully self-reliant and independent of the 
caprices of world capitalism. … [and] in converting the U.S.S.R. into an industrial 
country, to completely oust the capitalist elements, to widen the front of socialist 
forms of economy, and to create the economic basis for the abolition of classes in 
the U.S.S.R., for the building of a socialist country. … to create all the necessary 
technical and economic prerequisites for increasing to the utmost the defense 
capacity of the country, enabling it to organize determined resistance to any 
attempt at military intervention from abroad, to any attempt at military attack 
from abroad.87  
 
Molotov likewise pointed out a renewed international interest in resuming diplomatic relations 
once it was effectively determined the Soviet Union’s relative strength had successfully calcified 
at the international level.88  
Obviously, Soviet enterprise necessitated increased western industrial and technical 
imports, and increased American engineers pouring into Russia.89 These engineers’ eye-witness 
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accounts provided convincing tidings of Soviet state planning’s grandeur, and transcended 
divergent social systems to provide an accurate reflection of Soviet political and social 
constructs. Compared to earlier sojourners, these engineers were not spectators hurriedly 
shepherded through model hospitals, schools, and museums, but functioned as participant-
observers within Soviet factories. They also stayed for much longer periods of time than the 
casual American visitor, and signed contracts between one and three years. By 1931, however, 
staggering inefficiency and bureaucratic obstruction essentially terminated this technological 
exchange, and the relationship between Soviet and American engineers delved into friction and 
fracture. The Five Year Plans’ fever pitch strained nerves and provoked jealousy due to the 
higher pay and better living conditions of the American counterparts. Further intensifying 
tensions was the perpetual state of anxiety which preoccupied the Russian psyche, whereupon 
the slightest error may result in death and produced workmen who purposely avoided 
responsibility to circumvent incrimination. The spectacle of a vast backward country 
revolutionizing itself illuminated in 1933 what U.S. liberals and New Deal proponents echoed 
during in previous decades. Soviet leaders affirmed absolute security and a system compatible to 
their worldview, however, never committed to its solidification as the result of merely signing a 
single treaty, or winning only a single battle. Utopia thus required extreme patience balanced 
with numerous and difficult prerequisites, each of which contained promises of distantly future 
favorable conditions. The Soviet citizenry did not generally believe the immediate attainment of 
the communist ideal was possible, although few denied its eventual absolute achievement. Each 
international event furthered this elucidation because no time limit existed for its realization; 
each progression forward could thus be hailed a glorious victory, and any set-back 
proportionately minimized.  
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Chapter 3. Prelude to a Diplomatic Waltz: FDR’s Controversial First Steps, his 
Relationship with State Department, and Synopsis of Key Impediments to Recognition 
 
Diplomatic Calculations  
Key chronological landmarks evidence the Roosevelt administration’s steady progression 
toward Soviet recognition, and highlight FDR’s personal pursuit of its achievement – a desire 
harbored well before his inauguration. Recognition was thus hurriedly brought to fruition by a 
U.S. State Department apparatus carefully positioned to execute his direct and explicit orders. 
FDR’s stacked deck with State assured high level diplomatic meetings and correspondence, 
carried out clandestinely to assure a successful outcome with Moscow, and protect key American 
interests. Foreign Service officers represented a prominent part of the post-Second World War 
American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. Likewise, diplomats – especially each 
president charged with overseeing them – occupied equally significant roles during its inception 
and formulation.  
Many vacillated in their assessment of the Kremlin’s objectives, and viewed Moscow as 
unwilling to adhere to the social construct of the “family of nations” perception present within 
the interwar period. This contemptuous perspective of the Soviets as incorrigible ideologues 
antagonistic to western cooperation festered in the minds of government representatives. Those 
unwilling to accept this undifferentiated illustration perceived Moscow’s intentions in four 
distinct ways, each with its own distinctive foreign-policy paradigm. First, ideological 
cooperation assumed Russia willing to subscribe to and embrace the reconstruction of the post-
First World War world according to liberal-democratic values and beliefs derived from absolute 
and universal principles. These diplomats supported a policy of accommodation and 
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compromise. Secondly, ideological confrontation perceived the Soviets as confrontational; 
contended to represent ideological expansionism and aggressive threats to liberal-democratic 
values. This group advocated any action which provided an ideological counteroffensive without 
regard to its substantive make-up. Lastly, those who adopted a view of realistic cooperation 
perceived Moscow as indifferent to liberal-democratic values, and contended the Soviets adhered 
to a “world order based solely on national interests derived from the circumstances of relative 
military and political power.”90 As such, this group championed the formation of spheres of 
influence. Incidentally, realistic confrontation believed the advancement of Soviet interests by 
means of militaristic expansion, however, it was not seriously considered by professional 
diplomats, as it logically summoned forth a policy of retaliatory confrontation. Realistic 
cooperation ultimately won out and pervaded the State Department’s higher echelons, whose 
members viewed recognition as merely a brisk political victory. For Roosevelt, recognition was 
no mere stopgap; if the Soviet Union could be bolstered diplomatically and economically, 
perhaps it could then aid in halting Japan’s expansion. Further, the economic and political 
benefits of recognition would keep businesses happy, and forestall the rampant domestic crisis 
within the United States. Robert F. Kelley and the State Department, however, observed relations 
between the Soviets and other countries and declared “friction and controversy have been the 
inevitable result of recognition.”91  
Fortunately, Roosevelt employed his own particular brand of personal charisma as a 
delicate and calculating politician, which viewed the world in terms of manageable problems not 
                                                 
90 Hugh DeSantis, The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the 
Cold War, 1933-47, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 2-3. 
 
91 Robert F. Kelly to Congressman Hamilton Fish, 19 October 1929, box 3, folder 4, Robert F. Kelley 
Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.; Cassella-Blackburn, 92. 
44 
 
uncompromising dilemmas. For him, compromise was merely a part of any deal brokered and 
every person a willing participant, so long as they could be shown how they benefited. 
Persuading the American populace, however, called for a systematic gauging of public opinion, 
and the construction of a course for which recognition was the inevitable goal. Over a thirty-day 
period, the U.S. State Department surveyed 300 newspapers and revealed little interest in the 
premise, although direct inquiries to a total 1,139 newspapers revealed sixty-three percent 
favored recognition.92 Further, simultaneous estimations ranging from voter surveys, periodical 
editorials, and State department memoranda evidenced Americans were generally receptive to 
recognition. To guarantee success, however, western receptivity had to be matched with 
favorable and reliable information obtained from within the Soviet Union. FDR set about this 
task by commissioning several fact finding missions on his behalf – well in advance of his 
formal inauguration – and on the advice of advisors who called for just such a premise in May 
1932. During this process a key introduction ultimately proved most beneficial to FDR, and 
recognition overall.93  
Bullitt’s 1932 Trip to Europe  
Although the Republican Party enjoyed a monopoly of foreign relations leaders in 1932, 
William C. Bullitt’s unique experiences made him the most well-informed person on U.S-Soviet 
foreign affairs. Intimately connected with Soviet diplomatic affairs, Bullitt returned to the Soviet 
Union in May 1932 to renew old ties and conduct an informal survey of its conditions.94 On 
returning, Bullitt and close friend Louis Wehle devised a plan for seeking recognition which 
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required the latter’s October 1932 re-introduction of Roosevelt to Bullitt. Because Roosevelt was 
unable to travel outside the United States himself due to overwhelming domestic concerns, he 
was doubly eager to take advantage of Bullitt’s eyewitness accounts. FDR examined the exiled 
diplomat’s findings and gauged them a clarion call for foreign affairs, and calculated the 
approaching European political collapse inevitable unless imperative debt negotiations were 
implemented. At the behest of Roosevelt, Bullitt traveled to Europe three times between 1932-3 
to ascertain the precarious situations of key political leaders.95 Obviously, Bullitt’s overtures 
coincided nicely with the president’s quest for information regarding Russia, particularly because 
of Bullitt’s eagerness to leap back into American politics. Following twelve years compiling 
broad networks of acquaintances within Europe’s governments and academia, Bullitt fed off 
Roosevelt’s political magnetism and liberal outlook – just as he had done with Woodrow Wilson. 
Bullitt visualized FDR as the world’s last great hope, yet maintained a safe distance from the 
executive until after the election to ensure, then candidate, Roosevelt did not appear to overstep. 
This opening dialogue between Roosevelt and Bullitt solidified their political relationship 
and the junior diplomat’s place within the president’s newly formed State Department. Roosevelt 
and Bullitt became fast friends owing to a shared common social background, similarly 
“temperamental congeniality,” and heightened by a “boldly intuitional” nature.96 Because 
geopolitical and economic concerns constantly intertwined for the thirty-second president, 
Roosevelt tended to absorb only new information he could grasp quickly. Perhaps 
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subconsciously, he refrained from logical analysis and compensated by gambling – often 
successfully – on eleventh-hour, inspired decision-making. Louis Wehle claimed: 
Despite his moral courage, he [FDR] was, as I had occasions from observing, 
extremely sensitive to adverse criticism from friends, and was immediately 
depressed by it, although he would quickly recover his self-confidence or show of 
it. He shrank form private controversy. In listening to a proposal, he was inclined 
to avoid a plain negative answer, so that, as biographers and others have often 
noted, many left his presence interpreting his response as Yes when he had not 
said it; and misunderstandings often ensued.97  
 
Bullitt, however, possessed a capacity for sustained critical thinking which required relevant 
facts resolved into tangible plans of action. These complementary political tacticians were 
ideally matched: Bullitt vividly and swiftly made available his vast scholarship of world history 
and unique familiarity with European chieftains, and Roosevelt readily gleaned information 
which provoked decisive action.  
 Bullitt’s proximity to the Democratic Party and New Deal administration allowed him an 
immense influence on policy-making decisions and became “one of the chief advisors to 
President Roosevelt on the question of recognition.”98 An eleven-page memorandum chronicled 
his tour of Europe, relevant discussions held there, and correspondence home; all forwarded to 
Roosevelt by Wehle, who relayed FDR’s instructions back to Bullitt. Returning to the U.S on 16 
December 1932, Bullitt met with both Wehle and Roosevelt on 27 December to submit a full 
report. On 15 January 1933 Bullitt returned to Europe and continued submitting regular reports 
to Roosevelt at Warm Springs, Georgia. His activity, however, soon provoked suspicion and 
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scandal, with headlines that prompted a cancellation of the trip’s remainder; Bullitt returned to 
Paris on 10 February.99  
Although Bullitt initially supported recognition, he shared many of the State Department 
– East European Affairs Division’s reservations.100 By October 1933 he was asked to submit 
memoranda which outlined his views toward recognition and echoed earlier considerations put 
forth by Robert F. Kelley, particularly: “whatever method may be used to enter into negotiations 
with the Soviet Government, it seems essential that formal recognition should not be accorded 
except as the final act of an agreement covering a number of questions in dispute.”101 Bullitt 
remained optimistic about U.S.-Soviet relations and shared the president’s conviction that once 
recognition was accorded details necessary to clench such an agreement could be negotiated 
thereafter. Further, Bullitt’s European trips ripened the president’s resolve and  
crystallized Roosevelt’s advance determination to restore to the President the 
initiative in foreign relations, and educated him intensively for pursuing that 
policy … they helped to establish the precedent that a President-elect, within 
appropriate limits, may properly confer with domestic and foreign officials about 
problems that he will have to meet.102  
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This experience indelibly aided the executive’s future diplomatic and foreign policy 
considerations, and endowed him with a uniquely useful archive for coming decades.  
None of the men involved with Bullitt’s travels could foresee Hitler’s momentous 
rise, his long-term impact in world affairs, or the financial impact of actions carried out in 
at his direction. Incidentally, this shortsighted viewpoint represented a general failure 
present throughout Europe’s western leaders. The other equally historically significant 
figure which presented yet another unknown quantity was, of course, Stalin. The 
Georgian leader had to be cautious with proposed foreign policy objectives which 
deviated from orthodox Marxism, because Marxism-Leninism established an intensely 
ideological political and cultural structure facilitated by a staunchly philosophical and 
moral concept and precluded all others. This perception was integral to communist 
foreign policy. Stalin himself – replete in all his power – was bound by this system’s 
requirements for rationalizing deviations. Policy could thus be dictated from above, so 
long as it coincided with the institutional confines of communist morality. Incidentally, 
Walter Duranty – himself a champion of recognition and improved U.S.-Soviet relations 
– alerted in a 12 June 1933 New York Times article that Stalinism transitioned away from 
comprehensive global revolution, an occurrence which dictated “rival systems may live 
side by side in amity.”103 Stalin harkened to the world’s proletarian masses – common 
people who inevitably suffered greatly – and positioned the Soviet Union as their savior. 
With this shift away from carnage the Soviet government became “intensely pacifist,” in 
order to construct a socialist system which ensured the survival of its state and people.104  
 
                                                 





FDR’s Direct Appeal to Heads of State, May 1933 
 
 A further step toward solidifying Soviet approval of U.S. diplomatic recognition was 
Roosevelt’s historic May 1933 invitation, titled “Message to Heads of Governments,” as Soviet 
President Kalinin  was buried within the list of government heads destined to receive FDR’s 
urgent plea for peace.105 Some contend this controversial step alone constituted recognition, 
however, it may simply evidence Roosevelt’s spontaneity.106 Generally, such an important 
message would be disseminated by the State Department at the Secretary of State’s direct behest, 
however, Secretary Hull’s involvement in recognition’s lead-up are miniscule, if not largely 
ignored. Interestingly, Hull and several other division heads were not informed of Roosevelt’s 
inclusion of Kalinin in his address, until it became public knowledge.107 The final act, which 
signaled to the public and his posterity that Roosevelt intended to conduct recognition efforts 
personally and without interference, occurred when the executive dispatched Hull to the 
Montevideo Conference; far removed from Washington and the potential arrival of Russian 
representatives.108 Incidentally, for the majority of his secretaryship (unbeknownst to the public), 
extremely ill Hull suffered from diabetes and bi-lateral tubercular lesions.109 Harold L. Ickes 
recorded his pleasure at hearing this series of events which undoubtedly paved the way toward 
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recognition, a decision he and many in Washington had been in favor of for many years.110 
Moscow was similarly satisfied with the invitation, and recognized their inclusion in FDR’s 
appeal was the first direct communication between the Kremlin and the United States 
government, since the October 1917 Revolution.  
The London Economic Conference, June – July 1933 
 
 This diplomatic prelude’s final step was the June – July 1933 London Economic 
Conference. The singularly historic act of this conclave was Bullitt’s meeting with Litvinov, an 
awkward meeting considering the two had not had significant interaction for over a decade and 
had not generally been on good terms during their prior encounters. Numerous U.S. diplomats 
paraded through the Soviet delegation’s doors to meet with Litvinov and his colleagues, 
including Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Bullitt on 22 June, Assistant Secretary of State Raymond 
Moley on 2 July, and Hull; this impressive and unofficial procession simultaneously dispelled 
any question as to the Americans’ desire for recognition.111 The critical meeting between 
Litvinov and Morgenthau was the first official conversation between Soviet and American 
envoys, enunciated by a State department telegram which boasted “Delegation made its first 
contact with Russia and opened official conversations to sound out Russian willingness to 
participate in world wheat accord when Morgenthau saw Litvinov and found him particularly 
agreeable.”112 Taken together, these conversations “paved the way” toward rapprochement, 
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although any mention of trade negotiations was quickly quashed by Litvinov until formal 
recognition was formally extended. 113  
 Bullitt’s clandestine discussion with Litvinov at the London Economic Conference 
successfully connected the recognition issue with the far east’s political intrigue, and sought to 
position the Soviet Union as “a bulwark against the aggressive tendencies … developing in 
Japan.”114 Roosevelt asked Morgenthau and Bullitt in October 1933 to approach Boris Skvirsky, 
Moscow’s preeminent representative in the United States, and gave them explicit instructions on 
how they should proceed with the discussion. Following FDR’s detailed orders Morgenthau 
invited Skvirsky to his office where the Treasury Secretary promptly declared Bullitt would join 
them in five minutes with an unsigned paper which carried the president’s full authority. When 
Bullitt entered the room he stated   
This document can be made into an invitation … between our two countries. We 
wish you to telegraph the contents … by your most confidential code, and learn if 
it is acceptable to your people. If it is … the President will sign this piece of paper 
… If they are not acceptable, will you give me your word of honor that there 
never will be any publicity … and that the whole matter will be kept a secret?115  
 
Skvirsky assured them he agreed to the terms, and inquired if this was a confirmed signal  
diplomatic recognition was the goal. Bullitt quipped “what more can you expect than to have 
your representative sit down with the President of the United States.”116 The message and its 
importance were warmly received in Moscow, and FDR began corresponding with Kalinin, 
inviting Russia to send a representative to talk with him personally, and asserted “difficulties 
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between great nations can be removed only by frank, friendly conversations.” 117 This 
proposition was cordially received and accommodated; Kalinin’s response echoed optimism at 
overturning a “most abnormal and regrettable a situation.”118 
 
Key Impediments to Recognition 
 
A. The “Kerensky Debt” 
Emperor Nicholas II’s tsarist government was essentially replaced in March 1917 by 
Alexander Kerensky’s Provisional Government, which in turn capitulated to Bolshevik 
governance on 7 November. On 28 January 1918, the Soviets subsequently repudiated any 
indebtedness of the approximately ₽ 12,000,000,000 of either predecessor:   
(1) All State loans concluded by the governments of the Russian landowners and 
the Russian bourgeoisie enumerated in a list which is being especially published 
are annulled (annihilated) as from December 1, 1917. (2) In the same manner are 
annulled all guarantees given by the said governments of the loans of various 
enterprises and institutions. (3) All foreign loans are annulled unconditionally 
without any exception.119  
 
Roughly ₽ 7,000,000,000 of this total was composed of war loans, while the remainder was the 
result of bonds guaranteed or issued by the Imperial Russian government. A series of decrees 
quickly followed which privatized property inside the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet 
Republic, including regions in which the majority of foreign interests were located. In addition, 
one document was a waiver for all counterclaims against the United States for damages which 
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resulted from invasion of American troops during the allied intervention.120 The prescient 
realization that the Soviet leadership inherited all their predecessors’ assets, but not their 
liabilities spread throughout the west.121 The imperial family’s July 1918 liquidation, and exodus 
of remaining Romanov relatives, further complicated western expectations of collecting the 
$86,000,000 the tsarist government incurred through National City Bank during 1914 – 7.122  
Fear for the safety of the Provisional Government’s representatives and their eventual 
respective flights from Russia, similarly complicated matters. At the time of its November 1917 
collapse, Alexander Kerensky’s failed administration owed the U.S. Treasury $187,000,000 from 
purchasing military supplies.123 In addition to the funds denoted for the administrations of 
Nicholas II and Kerensky respectively, was $11,000,000 used to purchase military goods within 
the U.S., bringing the total of Russian military debt to $284,000,000.124 Obviously, the Soviets 
refused to incur this arrearage, due to their fundamental disagreement over Russia’s involvement 
in the war, in the first place.125 Further, the Soviet Union rejected the notion of paying back the  
₽ 117,650,000 in material they nationalized, most of which concerned International Harvester 
and Singer Sewing Machine, Co. With this addition, the grand total of money owed to the United 
States by the Russian leadership – recent past, and present – was $345,000,000 without 
interest.126 Comparatively, the U.S. held only seven percent of Russia’s overall war debt, 
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whereas nineteen percent was France’s, and seventy percent belonged to Great Britain; any 
settlement with the U.S. would thus have resultant repercussions in those allied nations as 
well.127 Further, according to the Soviet Union’s ideological dictates any capitalist loans 
proffered by the west were merely exploitative tools. Regardless of whether the Provisional 
Government or tsarist administration acquired the money – to reimburse western governments 
any amount was an acknowledgment of capitalist power and superiority.128  
B. Religious Rights of Americans in Russia, and Comintern Interference / Propaganda 
President Roosevelt was particular interested in the extent of religious freedom within the 
Soviet Union. Obviously, he was unable to obtain a formal guarantee of complete religious 
freedom within the Marxist state, and subsequently settled for a promise that all resident 
Americans in the Soviet Union would have the right to worship as they pleased, “in accordance 
with the dictates of their own conscience.”129 The Soviet Union’s 1936 “Stalin Constitution” 
included an unmistakable article with clear language which guaranteed religious freedom – a 
proviso heartily received by the western world – the truth, however, was a fundamentally 
atheistic and repressive Stalinist structure which crushed dissent and disseminated intensive anti-
religious propaganda. Incidentally, it did not acknowledge the previous 1929 Soviet Constitution, 
shepherded by Lenin, which prohibited religious propaganda.  
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Interference would be a continual matter during subsequent negotiations, particularly 
global concerns over the Comintern’s involvement in western domestic affairs. The American 
Minister in Riga informed the State Department,   
as for Russian propaganda in the United States, it is a fair guess that the Russian 
Government will agree to give it up and perhaps even … restrain the Communist 
Party … The Russians will not admit it but the fact is that their propaganda 
campaign is dying a natural death for the excellent reason that it does not pay.130 
 
As ambitious a prognostication as this was, it must be understood the extent to which the 
Comintern’s infrastructure had metastasized. Communist propaganda which originated from 
Moscow’s hub was not merely literature but a fully staffed apparatus, directed, subsidized, and 
controlled by party officials who sought to establish subservient Soviet satellites throughout 
Europe, Latin America, and the United States.131 Interestingly, the Comintern had not held a 
formal meeting since 1928 because Stalin’s machinery purposely toned down Trotsky’s premise 
of world revolution. In response to the failure of other industrialized states to follow Russia’s 
lead, Stalin championed “Socialism in One Country” to fill its void. According to the Soviet 
despot, the Soviet Union’s vast resources more than provided for their needs, therefore, outside 
assistance to build economic interests and a thriving infrastructure would be beneficial, but not 
required. It was hoped that if the Comintern lay dormant it would not frighten away possible 
capitalist collaboration, although this decline in emphasis continued until extensive debate 
eventually caused its 1935 revival. 
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FDR vs. The U.S. State Department   
 Roosevelt was far more worldly than the advisors which resisted him, yet his mastery of 
the political landscape’s shifting, inevitable priorities truly set him apart. FDR shunned naiveté 
and gleaned useful information from those with whom he trusted in order to strike a wide path 
for his will; in spring 1933, Roosevelt willed the United States to formally extend diplomatic 
recognition to the Soviet Union. With public opinion successfully on his side, the last remaining 
impediment to this goal appeared the U.S. State Department, caused by an organic divide along 
generational lines. Whereas Roosevelt’s foreign policy experience was driven by the First World 
War’s formative events and subsequent Treaty of Versailles’ failures, younger foreign service 
officers were contrastingly influenced by the 1938 Munich Agreement, and 1939 Nazi-Soviet 
Nonaggression Pact. The same specialization which created experts capable of understanding 
Soviet developmental nuances produced a generation of State Department analysts restricted in 
their willingness and ability to place the Soviet situation in a broader international setting.132 
This obsession with communism’s expansion all but blinded them to the increasing threat of 
Japanese and German militarism. The State Department’s Division of Eastern European Affairs 
only became more frustrated over time as their perception of being overlooked escalated into 
hostility, and eventually mutiny against the policies they were tasked to implement. They had no 
way of knowing just how high (or far back), the discontent spanned. 
 If John Nance Garner had not agreed to be FDR’s initial vice-president Hull was next in 
line for the position. Generally ignored by Roosevelt once appointed Secretary of State, Hull was 
surprised at initially even being considered, and advised by Louis Wehle to accept on condition 
that Roosevelt agree Hull chose his subordinates. Incidentally, Hull was so charmed by the 
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president-elect at Warm Springs he neglected to request this crucial caveat. As a result, FDR 
later handwrote a note to Raymond Moley which listed critical appointments and included the 
names of Breckenridge Long, William C. Bullitt, Sumner Welles, William Phillips, and other 
choices for second-tier staff. From the beginning, Roosevelt circumvented Hull and delt directly 
with these men which allowed unrestricted backchannels inside the administration. The decision 
to handpick sub-cabinet members evidenced Roosevelt’s detailed knowledge of governance and 
separated him from most executives. Secretary Ickes further lamented: 
The cold fact is that on important matters we [the Cabinet] are seldom called upon 
for advice. We never discuss exhaustively any policy of Government or question 
of political strategy. The President makes all of his own decisions … On 
particular questions he will call into his office persons directly interested, but it is 
fair to say that the Cabinet is not a general council upon whose advice the 
President relies or the opinions of which, on important matters, he calls for. Our 
Cabinet meetings only skim the surface of things on routine matters. As a matter 
of fact, I never think of bringing up even a serious departmental issue at Cabinet 
meeting, and apparently the other members follow the same policy...133  
 
Roosevelt expressed disappointment at not having greater contact to President Wilson while the 
Navy’s assistant secretary, and ensured his own subordinates did not feel the same.134  
 Robert F. Kelley drafted a lengthy memorandum which outlined key characteristics for 
pursuing or not pursuing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, and formally revealed a 
frustration with communist propaganda.135 Significantly, he drew the conclusion that communist 
ideology was the primary motivation for Soviet foreign policy; a not altogether untrue 
conclusion. Further, he confirmed states which already had agreements with the Soviets had just 
as many problems with propaganda as those which did not. Kelley postulated there was little 
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hope of successful rapprochement with the Soviets, even if a more finely detailed document were 
produced and agreed upon.136 The memo also stressed other issues such as protecting the broader 
civil rights of Americans within the Soviet Union, guarding against “economic espionage,” and 
ensuring diplomatic recognition would not be made retroactive and thus prejudice outstanding 
American claims against the Soviet Union.137  
 The portion of the memo meant to levy the most significance was Kelley’s synopsis of 
treaty promises created and disavowed by the Soviet government. Because Kelley was not 
enthusiastic about recognition, it is no surprise his studies emphasized difficulties and 
subsequent diplomatic relations with the Soviets, and surmised key issues (debts and claims, 
propaganda, and civil and religious rights) should be addressed before extending recognition. 
Condensed into seven categories of pledges which chronicled nearly every form of possible 
interference, this information was exacted by foreign governments to “bring about cessation of 
Russian interference in their domestic affairs.”138 According to Kelley, of the thirteen 
governments soliciting such understandings, eight found Soviet officials guilty of violating their 
pledges.139 This influential memorandum was a portion of Kelley’s detailed research into the 
issue of recognition. In all, he prepared a series of memorandums on “Problems Pertaining to 
Russian-American Relations”:     
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1. Russian Governmental Indebtedness to the Government of the United States. 
2. Russian Governmental Indebtedness to American Citizens. Dollar Loans  
 Floated in the United States. 
a. Recommendations and Considerations in Connection with the Question  
 of Russian Governmental Indebtedness to Government of the United  
 States. 
b. Russian Government Debt to the Government of the United States. 
3. Private American Claims against Soviet Russia. 
4. Questions of “Communist Propaganda.” 
5. Treaty Rights Essential to the Welfare and Protection of American Nationals  
 in Russia. 
6. Russian Government Property in the United States. 
7. Dominating Party and Governmental Organizations and biographies of  
 Prominent Party and Governmental Leaders of the U.S.S.R. 
8. Statements by Litvinov on Matters of Foreign Policy that are of Interest to the  
 United States. 
 
A key memorandum co-prepared by Kelley and Bullitt eventually defined the cornerstone of the 
State Department and larger administration’s position, and submitted to the president for 
approval on 21 September 1933. It forcefully elucidated that the time was ripe to engage the 
Soviets on their inability to meet their spring 1933 financial obligations to Germany; in addition, 
the increasing likelihood of a Japanese attack in the Pacific would drive the Soviets to beg for 
recognition.140 These two powerful appraisals were seen as the impetus for bringing about a 
favorable settlement of outstanding issues between the U.S. and Soviet governments.141  
 Both Bullitt and Hull accepted Kelley’s estimations and followed his directives, 
especially related to recognition’s three primary obstacles as expressed in a 27 July 1933 
memorandum: 1) “the world revolutionary aims and practices of the rulers of that country,” 2) 
“the Soviet ‘duty’ to acknowledge property and investments held by Americans in Tsarist 
Russia,” and 3) “difficulties arising out of the profound differences between the economic and 
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social structure of the two countries.”142 According to the State Department, recognition should 
not be granted until the Soviets were committed to the matter of halting propaganda, and outlined 
their specific plan to rectify outstanding debts to the United States. 
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Chapter 4. Sparring Partners: The Roosevelt-Litvinov Negotiations, Formal Recognition, 
and International Relations Theoretical Significance 
 
The Roosevelt – Litvinov Negotiations: 7 – 16 November 1933 
 
Travelers returned from the Soviet Union during the interwar period full of wonder and 
excitement, and played tricks on the American consciousness: technicians observed everyday 
realities but doubted the Bolsheviks’ insistence on faith catalyzing technology; spectator idealists 
recognized the power which motivated this faith, but failed to grasp the depth of its perversion; 
and engineers marveled at Soviet planning and daring.143 The symbolization of intervention as a 
means for restoring social equilibrium was familiar to President Roosevelt, who rationalized 
Soviet recognition in appealing verbiage which not only sought to achieve lofty objectives, but 
also served to couch violations of sound foreign policy’s basic components. Recognition was 
thus a tragic enterprise – at least in the manor with which FDR explored – due to the compromise 
of successful foreign policy which should have been more concerned with the maintenance of a 
balance of power, not kowtowing to a foreign entity to procure a political victory. This tragic 
decision lay squarely on President Roosevelt’s shoulders alone. Yet, both Roosevelt and Stalin 
affected a legendary cadence of charm when necessary, and the latter’s fondness for FDR “was 
as genuine a diplomatic friendship as he ever managed with any imperialist.”144 This primacy of 
diplomacy which highlighted the need for international relations as the organizing principle for 
effective policy was particularly evident in its connection with the two contrasting forms of high 
and low diplomacy. High diplomacy encompassed encounters between adversaries and allies 
alike which determined the international landscape’s stubborn details: national economic 
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strength, distribution of military power, and the overall cohesion of competing societies. In these 
instances, weak leadership presided over failure. Low diplomacy is occupied by less exalted 
figures such as ambassadors and professional staff members, who represent a respective 
government’s views and are variously occupied with political reporting. Often, this sub-level 
interaction became superfluous as heads of state communicate on routine matters; such was not 
the case for the culmination of this theses depiction of events.  
U.S. State Department officials favored the usual diplomatic method – lengthy, detailed 
negotiations conducted by conference – when assessing potential recognition efforts. Secretary 
of State Hull further insisted on having all outstanding issues between the U.S. and Soviets 
settled by lower diplomatic representatives before inviting senior diplomats to Washington. 
Roosevelt perceived this interminable approach’s inevitable outcome to be awkward 
compromise, or at worst, utter failure – an outcome FDR would not tolerate. Instead, the 
president sought a brilliant political victory furnished by smooth American diplomatic triumph, 
and after politely listening to Hull’s suggestions, “decided otherwise.”145 Further, the Soviet 
Union actively sought direct discussions with Roosevelt to serve a dual purpose of boosting the 
Kremlin’s international prestige, and harness potential advantages with an aim specifically 
directed toward Japan. Bullitt was similarly convinced the success of any negotiations depended 
upon Moscow’s choice of a key Soviet statesman – Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs – to broker this historic event. Bullitt maintained a terse relationship with 
Litvinov over the years, and attempted to meet on common ground by informing him of FDR’s 
desire to limit State or Treasury Department interference in their proceedings. Although Litvinov 
consistently regarded Bullitt a “bitter enemy,” he also acknowledged the Soviet propensity for 
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regarding foreigners as fools, and opined they only allow “themselves to be cheated … because it 
suits them.”146 He also understood his superiors (especially Stalin), were “traders at heart and 
love[d] to bargain.”147  
 Following FDR’s 10 October 1933 telegram which invited U.S.S.R. President Mikhail 
Kalinin to send a representative specifically to negotiate recognition, the Soviet Politburo 
produced a series of protocols which dictated Kalinin’s response, and designated Litvinov as its 
emissary to Washington.148 Significantly, the Politburo outlined strict guidelines for the elder 
statesman in which to conduct his relations with America: 
make sure our counter-claims related to [Allied] intervention are raised; the 
religious issue is an internal affair and should not be raised. Litvinov should not 
deviate from concrete discussions about our relations with Japan. If Roosevelt in 
discussion will make some rapprochement with us, or even a temporary 
agreement against Japan, then Litvinov must treat this propitiously.149 
 
Overly confident in his abilities and underestimating the president’s resolve, Litvinov 
declared prior to embarking, he “could reach an agreement with President Roosevelt in a 
half hour.”150 Upon arriving, he laughingly altered his projection and informed reporters 
he expected an agreement to be struck in “perhaps less” time than his original estimate.151 
Presumably made for diplomatic effect, Litvinov’s boast evidenced his fervent belief that 
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U.S. diplomatic recognition would be unconditional. Remarkably, Litvinov arrived in 
New York aboard the S.S. Berengaria on 7 November – the Bolshevik Revolution’s 
sixteenth anniversary – where he was greeted by a throng of reports upon 
disembarking.152 With typical cosmopolitan frankness and flair, he announced his 
intention to only discuss “the question of diplomatic relations” during his visit; all other 
discussions would be postponed until recognition was accorded.153 Fortunately for the 
purposes of this thesis, Litvinov’s colorful presage was thwarted by President Roosevelt.  
In preparation for intense negotiations over key impediments discussed previously (the 
“Kerensky debt,” religious rights of Americans in Russia, and Comintern interference / 
propaganda), all twenty-six relevant treaties between the Soviets and other nations which already 
extended them recognition, were carefully examined and gleaned of potential borrowings.154 
Once discovered the extent to which Moscow granted past concessions, Bullitt and his advisors 
readied arguments for objections they assumed Litvinov would present. By absorbing “a phrase 
here and a sentence there,” every word of their prepared draft had “already appeared in some 
treaty to which Russia had affixed her signature and seal.”155 Fortunately for the overall 
negotiation process Litvinov eventually abandoned his expectation of requiring recognition be 
extended before taking part in any further discussions. This approach may have been purely 
tactical, although his stubbornness remained well after the finalized recognition agreement. Upon 
being shown the draft of mutual abstention to internal affairs interference, Litvinov exclaimed 
“we can’t agree to this!” to which Hull calmly explained Russia’s government had already done 
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so, as the agreement’s text was prepared using wording directly gleaned from treaties the Soviets 
previously signed.156 The same routine occurred with the draft of religious freedom for 
Americans in Russia, whereupon Litvinov insisted on the sufficiency of existing Soviet laws.157 
In his memoirs, Hull boasted there were as many as twenty drafts of the proposed recognition 
agreements, to ensure they were nothing short of “ironclad.”158 From the outset, the key to the 
agreement’s success concerned the Communist International, although this preparatory phase 
and the agreement’s final draft omitted any mention of the Comintern, directly. This was no 
oversight, but a well-thought out maneuver by Kelley who believed if the organization were 
specifically named, the Soviets would merely change its title and assert it was thereby not 
embodied in the agreement. By providing for all such entities and their activities, the 
Comintern’s inclusion was assured, in addition to meeting the complex and politically essential 
parameters presented by American public opinion.159   
 The first session of negotiations occurred the morning of 8 November 1933 between 
Litvinov and his entourage, and the U.S. represented by Hull, Bullitt, Kelley, and Undersecretary 
William Philips.160 The latter party did not take formal notes of the proceedings, except for 
Bullitt’s brief note on the final day. Detailed recollections of the events were therefore presented 
orally to the president, and variously published in later accounts and/or the executive’s archival 
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repositories.161 The Americans adamantly informed their guests that recognition would only 
come as a result of a successful resolution to the questions regarding propaganda/interference 
within another state’s domestic affairs, debts and claims, and religious freedom. As expected, 
Litvinov refused any concession on these matters and demanded recognition be granted first; 
only then would the Soviets consider rectifying these complicated issues – just as they had 
promised all other nations which had extended recognition up to that point. Observing they were 
at an impasse the meeting was closed with both sides equally frustrated, and a luncheon was 
given by the president in honor of the foreign secretary, with all State department representatives 
and cabinet members in attendance. Harold L. Ickes optimistically recorded: 
Personally, I have been in favor of the recognition of Russia by the United States 
for a good many years and so it was a particular pleasure for me to be at this 
luncheon to meet members of the Litvinov party. I have no doubt that recognition 
will result from conversation in progress here now, and I sincerely hope so.162 
 
Roosevelt eventually got down to the business at hand and reminded Litvinov that two 
primary sources of military threated the Soviet Union – Germany and Japan – both of which 
were eager to consume other states’ territory for their own respective benefit.163 Litvinov 
reported FDR stressed “we [the Soviet Union] are located between these dangers, but that 
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together we would be able to avert these dangers.”164 After the meal, Roosevelt dismissed 
everyone but Litvinov and Hull. The ambitious president – in office less than a year – explained 
he must ultimately deal with Congress and the American public in order to ensure the agreement 
was well received. Perhaps in an attempt to express sympathy for Litvinov’s position, or in a 
calculated move to assuage Soviet sensitivities, FDR agreed it was vital to avoid demands which 
characterized the U.S. as intervening in Russia’s internal affairs. He even went so far as to 
concede he always doubted the morality of necessitating “receipt of tsarist debts, and that [allied] 
intervention in Archangelsk was in in no way justified.”165 Roosevelt could not realistically ask 
for the Comintern’s removal from Moscow, although the final agreement required the Kremlin to 
sever ties with the American Communist Party and any related communist-controlled 
organizations in the U.S. FDR admonished Hull and Litvinov to return to their negotiations 
under the pretext of assuaging the American public’s fears about Soviet interference in western 
domestic affairs.166 This conversation culminated in Litvinov and Roosevelt emphasizing that 
war and peace were the true issues of recognition, and rightly justified their full attention.  
Without Roosevelt’s artful yet heavy hand, subsequent days’ conversations turned to 
finance, and both sides increased hostility toward their counterpart’s waffling. Litvinov appeared 
unaware of the electrified atmosphere which surrounded debts and claims, and blustered he 
“continuously worked over Bullitt” precisely on that issue, although he later conceded Bullitt 
“placed us in the most impossible situation” with this complex financial situation. 167 A single 
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one-hour conversation on 10 November, however, swiftly produced a dramatic shift in 
Litvinov’s outlook.168 In fact, several instances of this good cop/bad cop routine occurred: Bullitt 
frustrated Litvinov only to have Roosevelt later the same day counter, in order to allay Litvinov’s 
anxiety and thereby produce a conciliatory atmosphere with which to gain Soviet trust.169 In 
every instance, FDR employed his characteristic combination of sincerity, humor, and 
friendliness in forcing Litvinov to reconsider his position on religious freedom for Americans in 
the Soviet Union, and a proposal on propaganda as a whole. Although these concerns were 
indeed pressing matters for the men involved in the negotiations, the primary crux of the decision 
hinged on procuring an acceptable formula to present Congress. Unfortunately for the 
negotiations, an additional factor brought renewed pressure; President Roosevelt planned to 
leave Washington on 17 November and should the negotiations continue with only State 
department representatives in attendance, it would produce disastrous consequences. Hull left for 
Montevideo on 10 November, and Litvinov recognized the renewed sense of urgency which 
permeated his interactions with the Americans, all of whom remained convinced the Soviets 
required recognition far more than the U.S. needed to extend a diplomatic courtesy.170  
A differing perspective was produced, however, which lampooned the Roosevelt’s 
administration’s actions and portrayed its exacerbation as “forcing their way through an open 
door.”171 Complicated by eastern prejudices, the negotiations progressed with more difficulty 
and dragged on longer than Moscow envisioned. Additionally, the 1929 Stock Market Crash 
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caused the world’s authoritarian governments to perceive America’s hypocritical democratic 
ideals as fractured and decayed. In order to overcome this set back internationally, Roosevelt 
needed to evidence American strength and was thus compelled to “win” the conditions 
demanded of Litvinov with great difficulty. Conversely, Roosevelts’ enemies would claim he 
sold out to communism without these negotiations, which forced him to convince fervent 
reactionaries he was tough on the reds and strong-armed them into a corner. According to this 
opposing viewpoint, the executive simultaneously proved sixteen years of quarantine had been 
not only logical, but further, only when Russia “appeared before the eyes of the world cleansed 
of its sins” could the United States accept the coalescence of Bolshevik atonement.172 This was 
beneficial not only for winning over public sentiment, but because the U.S.S.R. would not buckle 
to inordinate claims of financial and ideological dictates, America required excessive demands to 
paint Soviets as intractable. Scholars of this creed contended Washington never intended to open 
U.S.-Soviet relations with close political cooperation, particularly in full view of potential 
international state aggressors. Representing the Soviet Union as a difficult partner from the 
outset thus took prevalence, and Soviets for their part, grudgingly allowed an American 
“victory” over them, although “only within the limits of decency.”173 This convincingly 
oppositional and controversial perspective appeared at first glance to be strikingly conspiratorial, 
although it does bear relevant points of interest, and offered a fascinatingly parallel view of U.S.-
Soviet relations during this period.  
Again Roosevelt requested an informal conversion with Litvinov “man-to-man” at the 
close of the negotiations late one evening. The president joked “he wanted … to be able to call 
                                                 






Mr. Litvinov names” if he chose, and “certainly hoped that Mr. Litvinov would feel free to call 
him names too.”174 Possessing a unique mastery of the English language, Litvinov understood 
this jest, and “laughed heartily.”175 Over the course of a three-hour meeting, the two men 
“resolved differences over propaganda, subversive activities, and religious practices,” followed 
by an additional two-hour discussion on 12 November where they took up the matter of  legal 
rights for Americans inside the Soviet Union.176 Up to this point, the president followed the State 
Department’s suggested format in debating recognition’s prerequisites, until he hinted on the 
issue of debt repayment. In fact, FDR’s departure from suggested procedure was disastrous and 
before discussions began, the polio-stricken executive admitted he “cared less for the financial 
portion of the negotiations than any other phase.”177 This was actually a carefully calculated plan 
for maintaining a “high plane” during the negotiations; in Roosevelt’s opinion – there would be 
plenty of time to discuss business with the Russians during future interactions.178 Although FDR 
viewed Soviet compensation as necessary for any further cooperation, the Soviets perceived this 
open-ended tabling of such a crucial matter as an invitation to ensure reparations never occurred, 
especially without additional concessions such as extensive credits, outright loans, or substantial 
reductions in interest payments. In a mere two days, the president secured an agreement on 
propaganda, religion, economic espionage, and legal protection of American nationals! Litvinov 
checked in with his government to see if concessions were acceptable, followed by two more 
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days of discussions regarding debt. This heightened sense of success and relief played on the 
imaginations of Bullitt and Roosevelt (particularly the latter), which caused him to make a 
stupendously ill-advised decision on 15 November to extend a “gentleman’s agreement” to his 
Soviet guest.179 It is extremely difficult to ascertain whether this oscillating exchange of 
frustration and euphoria was Litvinov’s intentions all along, or merely a fortunate by-product of 
drudgingly prolonged high-stakes negotiations between intellectual equals.   
Recognizing the fundamental importance of establishing amicable relations with the U.S. 
and the mutual strengthening of international peace, Litvinov’s delegation decided that once 
recognition was extended the Soviet government would commit to considering questions of 
satisfying a limited number of American material claims. His only stipulation was that such 
compensation would not in turn reopen discussions of previously settled claims with other states. 
This conciliation, and Litvinov’s reservation, formed the basis of the 15 November accord sealed 
by a “gentleman’s agreement” which established the minimum and maximum range for future 
financial negotiations, and allowed both parties to table the issue until subsequent official talks 
following further consultation. The monetary details incorporated into this agreement would be 
the basis of contention for several years following Roosevelt and Litvinov’s private discussion. 
This “gentleman’s agreement” included revised estimates – submitted by both sides – wherein 
the United States could expect to be repaid between $75 - $150 million providing one important 
condition was met: the extension of a high interest rate loan to the U.S.S.R.180 Its purpose was to 
reimburse American citizens with confiscated and/or nationalized property claims against the 
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Soviet government.181 A minimum of $75 million would cover the debt incurred by Kerensky’s 
administration to prosecute war against Germany, but not the amount incurred by the tsarist 
government, or finances extended to third parties to overturn the Bolsheviks. FDR’s involvement 
unfortunately caused the monetary portion of the final agreement to be loosely worded, which 
utilized the words credits and loans interchangeably.182 Bullitt maintained he and the president 
perfectly understood the meeting ‘s content in which this was discussed, and that Litvinov knew 
no loans could be granted to foreign governments, thus according to Bullitt he and his guests 
were on the same page.183  With mutual agreement rectifying three of the pressing issues, and the 
shortsighted implementation of the “gentleman’s agreement” which effectively postponed the 
final matter of debt repayment, the negotiations were complete.184  
Formal Recognition – 16 November 1933 
 
 A public exchange of letters took place on 16 November between Litvinov and Roosevelt 
confirming the agreement’s finer points: the Soviet government’s unilateral commitment for a 
declaration on religious freedom, and reciprocal declarations to establish committees to abandon 
hostile propaganda, and the rights of citizens, respectively.185 The notes referring to religious 
freedom were the longest and spanned more than three pages of the published report. President 
Roosevelt referred to his expectation that once normal relations were established many 
Americans may “wish to reside temporarily or permanently” within the Soviet Union, and his 
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deep concern “they should enjoy in all respects the same freedom of conscience and religious 
liberty which they enjoy at home.”186 This initial set of agreements directly specified recognition, 
and were addressed to “My Dear Mr. Litvinov:”  
I am very happy to inform you that as a result of our conversations the 
Government of the United States has decided to establish normal diplomatic 
relations with the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to 
exchange ambassadors. I trust that the relations now established between our 
peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth 
may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the 
world.187  
 
Interestingly, Roosevelt’s letter to Litvinov initiating recognition did not note economics, but 
“the great work of preserving peace should be the corner stone of an enduring friendship.”188 
Similar to the previous cadence of letters exchanged with Kalinin, Litvinov’s reply was nearly 
identical to Roosevelt’s, opening with “I am very happy to inform you that the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is glad to establish normal diplomatic relations.”189 The 
remainder copied FDR’s letter word for word. Incidentally, in so doing the foreign commissar 
omitted any references to the final decision being the result of negotiations in Washington. By 
focusing on his government’s acceptance of the decision, Litvinov diverged from Roosevelt’s 
choice of stating the decision as fact, and instead highlighted the Soviets’ pleasure at resuming 
diplomatic relations. One is cautioned, however, to not read further into the documents’ 
expression, as no indications suggested “differences in phraseology were more than formal.”190  
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Although the formal diplomatic recognition documents were dated 16 November, 
Roosevelt explained at Cabinet meeting on 17 November him and Litvinov “arrived at a meeting 
of minds … about midnight” the night before.191 Another source corroborated this and specified 
the various agreements were simultaneously signed fourteen minutes before 1:00AM on 17 
November, with Bullitt and other State department officials present.192 “Visibly pleased,” 
Roosevelt’s infectious elation was all the more exacerbated when celebrations commenced in the 
president’s study with quaffs of prohibition beer, and a request “to join him in a toast to the new 
relationship.”193 Later in the day, the president ordered the agreements to be released to the press, 
whilst announcing the resumption of formal diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia; Ickes 
recorded “as near as I could make out, the President got everything that he wanted out of these 
conversations.” 194 Upon setting sail for Russia on 17 November, Litvinov remarked to the press  
Yesterday’s exchange of notes not only creates conditions indispensable to the 
rapid and successful settlement of the unsolved problems of the past, but, what is 
more important, opens a new chapter in the development of genuinely friendly 
relations and peaceful cooperation between the two greatest republics.195 
 
Soviet President Kalinin echoed this sentiment in his 20 November radio address, and Stalin 
observed from the Soviet Congress of the Communist Party, “this act is of very great 
significance for the whole system of international relations.”196 In so doing, the Georgian despot 
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again emphasized the establishment of Soviet-American relations’ singlehanded impact on the 
temporary preservation of global peace. 
Undoubtedly, the fact Litvinov signed the pledges emphasized the importance Moscow 
attached to U.S. recognition, and considerable evidence indicated the Soviet government 
regarded American commitments as unusually broad concessions. Because Soviet leadership 
expected violations of the finalized agreements to occur regardless, the Russian general populace 
was never made aware of the document’s exact wording, nor did Soviet newspaper coverage 
include extensive commitments made to the United States. Chairman of the Council of People’s 
Commissars V.M. Molotov – and Litvinov himself, for over a year and a half – proffered 
repeated assurance that the Soviet Union refused to make concessions not in accordance with 
strict Soviet ideological policies.197 Litvinov went so far as to declare in a 29 December 1933 
report to the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.: “at the national or governmental level 
contradictions between her [America] and our Union are absent, and troublesome questions were 
easily resolved.”198 Although he referred to the recognition agreements as a whole, without 
describing the agreements’ contents, Litvinov’s careful remarks served notice that the Soviet 
Union would limit the application of non-interference to its governmental structure. 
Relevant International Relations Theories and Applications  
 President Roosevelt’s actions and precise language in the final documents exchanged 
between him and Litvinov, evidenced a staunch conviction that diplomatic recognition was 
instrumental to securing a foundation for world peace. In order to provide the necessary conduit 
for cooperative guarantees of disarmament, nonaggression, and the settlement of disputes by 
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negotiation, ease of access to Russia through diplomatic channels was essential. The significance 
of Roosevelt’s actions lay not in reversing decades of impractical policy, but rather in pursuing 
utopian goals as the basis for altering it. While various terminology – such as “securing peace,” 
“realistic objectives,” and “containment” (of German Fascism and Japanese militarism) – was 
employed leading up to the eventual recognition decision, no true understanding of underlying 
policy dynamics existed with respect to international relations as a whole. Supporters of 
recognition refused to assess Russia according to the moralistic crusade established by 
recognition’s opponents, however, they did adopt “the Wilsonian concept of moral strength as a 
substitute for real power.”199 President Roosevelt can likewise be viewed as a quixotic figure 
jousting at the armor of aggressive foes, with a “rubber lance of world opinion, which appeared 
so deceptively firm.”200  
 Governments differed in their use of ideologically based recognition policies, although 
the twentieth century’s interwar period witnessed considerable premature diplomatic 
recognitions throughout Europe. This resulted in a relatively loosely defined system of control, 
which stemmed from hatred levied against the Bolsheviks. Generally, the United States has been 
the most concerned about recognition’s applications on international relations, although the 
Soviets also utilized it for ideological purposes following the Second World War. Three 
developments occurred during the twentieth century which gave impetus to cementing modern 
recognition practices and criteria. First, non-recognition was used to express ideological dislike 
for newly formed governments, and the period of non-recognitions correspondingly lengthened 
according to the perceived radicalism of said nation’s governmental structure; no surprise its 
                                                 






occurrence increased dramatically following 1917. During the nineteenth century the maximum 
length for this was three years, whereas during the interwar period it increased to sixteen, and 
following the Second World War it ballooned to thirty or more years.201 Caught between the 
need for contact amongst emerging international markets and systems of government, and 
pervasive fears that recognition constituted significant alterations in attitude toward new 
governments, policy-makers merely expanded the classifications of “administrative,” 
“nonpolitical,” “temporary,” “technical,” and “informal” relations permissible within nineteenth 
century international law. While this development is obviously the easiest solution, several of the 
twentieth century’s prolonged non-recognitions were based upon deep-seeded antipathies shared 
and encouraged by the respective nation’s general populace.  
Wise foreign policy was formulated based on the acceptance of a state’s need for direct 
contact with the outside world, thereby instilling an acceptance of recognition’s realities well 
before one’s population arrived at the same conclusion. Once initiated, ideological non-
recognitions’ precedence was difficult to reverse, primarily because large influential swaths of 
both states viewed any change in attitude with respect to the new regime as potently significant. 
Governments therefore created workarounds in order to address particular crises which arose on 
an ad hoc basis, and expanded the content of indirect contact to do so. Chapter Three’s analysis 
of FDR’s initial steps to feel out Soviet receptivity to recognition’s extension contains prime 
examples of similarly ad hoc measures, particularly Roosevelt’s addition of Kalinin to his May 
1933 “Direct Appeal to Heads of State.”202 Second, this tendency was bolstered by governmental 
                                                 
201 3-year example: Serbia following the 1877-8 Russo-Turkish War; 16-year example: see CHAPTER II – 
ESTRANGEMENT, 1917-32; 30+ year example: the Portuguese government never recognized the Soviet 
Government established in 1917, and was itself overthrown in 1974. 
202 Buell, Raymond Leslie. “Our Recognition of Russia: Arguments For and Against.” The New York 
Times, 16 July 1933, XX3. 
78 
 
activity during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which expanded into areas of 
regulating economic activity, health, transportation, scientific research, and social services 
previously left largely to private industry. International cooperation in these fields soon became 
necessary and required increased contact with other states, similar to experiences with the 
suppression of crime, or regulation of international trade and finance. Maintaining contact thus 
encouraged the routinization of administrative matters kept separate from political decisions, 
such as entering into formal diplomatic relations with a foreign state. This factor, especially 
when conjoined with the pattern of protracted non-recognition of new governments, broadened 
the spectrum of low-level intra-state contact; Chapter Three pointed out such covert associations, 
specifically Bullitt’s informal European and Russian tours during 1932. 
 Lastly, this era contained an intensive expansion of multilateral relations – in the form of 
conferences or permanent intergovernmental organizations – which stemmed from a desire to 
heighten cooperation within non-political arenas to avoid further global conflict. This 
formulation of fresh mechanisms of political collaboration reinforced the second trend’s effects, 
and consequently made avoidance of political interaction with unrecognized governments 
significantly more onerous. The majority of multilateral undertakings resulted in a cohesive 
qualified majority of members which decided who else could participate, and had the unintended 
consequence of forcing a state’s government to consider political expediency with a party it did 
not – or refused to – recognize. A plausible check against such schoolyard dynamics was 
allowing enough other members of the organization to agree the latter party should not be 
allowed to participate in their undertakings. Fortunately for history’s sake, such a consensus 
often could not be reached, and thereby placed the snobbish outlier in a position where 
diplomatic discussions could not be avoided, and caused bilateral relations to metastasize into 
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multilateral affiliations. No historical event can thusly be categorized into such a neat 
expectation, and legal scholars tend to advocate requiring all of an organization’s membership to 
recognize a new government once allowed to participate, however, it is reasonable to assume that 
no state would relinquish its recognition authority over to another. Once again, Chapter Three 
described just such a multilateral forum during summer 1933 at the London Economic 
Conference, and highlighted unofficial discussions between Soviet and American representatives 
which took place there. 
 Prior to 1917 the United States government preferred de facto recognition, although 
following this seminal year America cast aside its creation. The nature and construction of 
America’s position pre- and post-1917 was formulated by historic policy positions which 
concerned recognition of new state governments: 
Since the late eighteenth century, the legally constituted government of a state has 
been acknowledged as a government de jure (by right or by lawful title), while a 
government de facto has been considered a government in actual functional 
control of a nation or territory (a government in fact).203  
 
The year 1918 was a watershed moment in international relations, because non-recognition and 
recognition frequently express sympathy or hostility for a new government. Traditional doctrines 
– circumstances defined by governments – delayed recognition and masked decisions taken for 
arbitrary reasons. The essential distinction in distinguishing the conditions which establish de 
facto qualifications has nearly always been said government’s ability to discharge the routine 
obligations of a state, and maintenance of its power and infrastructure. When de facto 
governments prove their ability to control their territory and populace, they transition to a de jure 
designation. No international legal mechanism existed to distinguish at what point de facto 
control converted to de jure authority, although in practice this capacity was relegated to foreign 
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states to generate this determination, based largely on the dictates of external state recognition. 
Ordinarily a government which sought recognition attempted to formalize its stature by 
promulgating a constitution, conducting an election, or both. The U.S.S.R. produced such a 
constitution in 1924 under Lenin’s direction, and incidentally, Stalin amended his predecessor’s 
dictates with a 1936 iteration. Those who advocated abolishing government recognition agree to 
its necessity so long as the international system lacked centralized institutions capable of 
stipulating when a new state emerges, and is only further complicated with the recent emergence 
of non-state actors.  
Diplomatic recognition served three objectives in the international legal system due to a 
given government’s propensity for ensuring:   
only regimes clearly deserving such status are accepted as governments of states, 
assuring new governments that others will respect their status, and informing 
courts, government agencies, and nationals of recognizing states that a particular 
regime is in fact the government of another state.204  
 
Russia’s location, size, and potential rendered these stipulations relatively trouble-free, and the 
Soviet government generally resisted such conditions because of its favorable position to do so. 
Following French and British recognition, the Soviet Union expressed clearly its opposition to 
conditional prerequisites. Hungary attempted to extract agreements in exchange for Soviet 
recognition, whereupon Alexei Rykov informed the May 1925 Soviet congress: 
Recently we refused to conclude an agreement with Hungary because we saw no 
need to buy the recognition of Hungary and of countries like Hungary, at the cost 
of concessions which might one way or another conflict with the interests of our 
Union. The other states [such as Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, or 
Yugoslavia] will have to take into account that the later they are, the worse it will 
be for them.205  
 
                                                 





Denmark eventually accorded recognition to the Soviets in early 1923 primarily because of the 
Russian state’s potential.  Similarly, Switzerland’s recognition was nearly extorted owing to 
Soviet insistence on establishing diplomatic relations before beginning negotiations on the 1923 
Vorovsky Affair – the Swiss resisted such pressure. The Roosevelt-Litvinov negotiations, 
solidified by U.S. recognition, were thus not taken to be stipulations of this nature.  
 Both lawyers and statesmen are interested in governmental recognition. Lawyers 
recognize it as a long-standing legal institution which allowed for the essential function of 
identifying major international actors; statesmen took advantage of such looseness in the family 
of nations which allowed them to utilize recognition to not only identify state actors, but also 
articulate opinions about, and secure concessions from them. Domestic law defined recognition 
as a means for formally acknowledging that a situation or entity existed, coupled with assurances 
the legal consequences of such an arrangement was upheld and respected. States are abstract 
entities – which possessed central mechanisms to make and enforce policies – although 
internationally, a human agent is indispensable to act in its name. While separate distinctions are 
possible, historically one agency has filled both roles, and international law was erected on the 
assumption that the two will converge and be fulfilled by this same agency. An important 
distinction was made, however, depending upon how a government changed hands – whether by 
domestic authority indirectly passed to a successor, or via “legitimate” constitutional means. The 
issue of recognition does not arise when governments transition according to the latter, and thus 
domestic rule is deemed sufficient for denoting international agency. When a change of 
government occurs by non-constitutional means (as it did with the Bolshevik seizure of power), 
however, a specific requirement is imposed on the new government: the exercise and 
maintenance of effective rule over the state in question, against all challengers. Obviously, 
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recognition is also withheld for various reasons outside lack of effective state rule. Soviet leaders 
willingly provided such assurances in 1933, although (according to the west), they failed to make 
good on all they promised once recognition was extended.  
 The recognition of the Soviet Union solidified a new doctrine which caused the 
traditional functions performed by a given government’s recognition efforts to reverse, and 
therefore equated formal diplomatic relations with the acceptance of a new government’s 
existence. This altered the traditional format of having diplomatic relations as an act equivalent 
to recognition, and essentially constituted acceptance of a new government’s status in reverse. 
International law with respect to recognition, therefore, hinged on two primary themes:   
(1) the circumstances necessitating and the conditions permitting recognition of a 
new government, and (2) the effects of granting or withholding recognition for the 
new government, the deciding government, their respective states and nationals, 
and third parties.206 
  
Developments in both these arenas forced legal institutions to become involved. Western 
hemisphere administrations in the late nineteenth century established a precedence for respective 
states – or more specifically within democratic formulated nations, a state’s people – to establish 
the specific government it desired. This often ignored doctrine provided powerful incentives to 
assertions that a government’s origins paled in comparison to its ability to effectively maintain a 
state, and extract obedience from its populace. This perception was a powerfully contentious 
rationale because recognition only became an issue when regimes ascended to power by methods 
contrary to the customs, constitution, or laws of the nation affected. A succession of power 
manifested according to means considered a legal process could thus:    
be interpreted to mean that the recognition granted to one government was handed 
to its successor along with the rest of its legitimate claims to power, the idea that 
                                                 




origins should be irrelevant won wider acceptance as the principles of self-
determination and nonintervention gained adherents.207 
 
Once bestowed recognition is irrevocable, and no government can respond retroactively 
to a real or perceived ideological difference it failed to perceive when considering its decision 
initially. The political uses of recognition therefore possess an element of accident, perhaps most 
clearly personified by the United States government’s subsequent policies regarding Cuba and 
Fidel Castro’s ascension to power. The U.S. recognized the Castro regime within a week of its 
accession.208 By utilizing recognition for political purposes, the American government then 
relegated their efforts to other methods of expression and influence regarding the Caribbean 
island, because they acted too swiftly before the situation entirely revealed itself. The political 
uses of recognition had two notable results for power distribution. The first occurred when a 
hegemonic power encountered a far easier time imposing its will through a coordinated 
recognition policy. Obviously, any breach in hegemony – real or perceived – caused the political 
uses of recognition to become exponentially problematic. Next, greater fluidity of alignment 
allowed non-hegemonic states the dual benefit of pursuing their own political uses for 
recognition, and protection from single-power domination. The imposition of stipulations 
therefore attempted to influence specific acts, and the general policy of new governments which 
rested on withholding recognition until the government adopted a desired act and policy. 
 A pattern of political purpose more easily resolved cases where recognition was bestowed 
before other states determined the new government effectively governed its state. Effective 
control was customarily accepted as the necessary precondition for recognition, and rendered 
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premature recognition illegal; any government which bestowed it as such, required compelling 
political motives for performing it.209 Aggressors and challengers to an established state would 
therefore not like to see such tenets displayed with reverence. For instance, an acute sticking 
point in U.S.-Soviet relations during this period was repayment of Soviet debt. This occupied 
widespread interest for everyday U.S. citizens because of its lasting effects on American 
corporations and government, each of which suffered tremendous losses as a result of the Soviet 
government’s actions. Although its legal elements were essentially the crux of the matter was 
essentially, in a larger sense the foundational tenets tampered with were psychological and 
political, owing to the pervasive American sanctification of private property. Few Americans in 
1933 had a foundation of knowledge regarding the Soviet system, however, the violation of 
private property was far more widely known than any of the Bolsheviks’ other activities, and 
constituted a disavowal of the readily accepted principles of governance within the family of 
nations. This exemplified Kelley’s 27 July 1933 memorandum in which he attempted to impress 
upon Roosevelt, “Among these principles is the duty of … a Government to honor the financial 
obligations contracted by a State under preceding Governments.”210  
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Chapter 5. Diplomatic Significance and Resultant Ramifications for U.S. – Soviet Relations 
 
The historically significant events and outcomes depicted within this thesis are buttressed 
by extensive U.S. – Soviet relations. Bureaucratic politics certainly played its part within each 
stage, yet these developments conclusively established the importance of individuals to history. 
Modern historians posit this argument’s validity predated the explosion of twentieth century 
foreign policy bureaucracy, while others counter such an approach was relatively easy to levy 
during this discordant time period. The Russian Empire – tsarist, and Stalinist – possessed an 
inherent opposition to American principles of government. The former maintained a stalwart 
unwillingness to convene with a state born of revolution; a slight which characterized early 
prejudices, and undergirded the mutually mistrustful relations between the latter and the United 
States. Tsarism had no patience for revolution; as a result, Russia was among the last powers to 
recognize the United States when it declared its independence from Great Britain. In fact, it was 
not until 1809 that Tsar Alexander I conferred recognition on the American government, and 
welcomed a permanent diplomatic mission headed by John Quincy Adams posted to the St. 
Petersburg court. Further, no treaty relations were established until 1824, nearly a half century 
after America’s famous proclamation to Britain’s George III.211 Although ever fearful of 
Republicanism and eager to halt its exacerbation, Russia’s Catherine II eventually extended 
cordial relations to the American government during the nineteenth century. Similar 
circumstances occurred following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution when the opposite situation 
was personified by America’s loathsome perspective toward Russia’s Marxist administration. A 
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far different approach befell their predecessors, when on 22 March 1917 the U.S. became the 
first country to recognize Kerensky’s Provisional Government:   
Because all of the procedural formalities were fully complied with in the transfer 
of tsarist authority to the Provisional Government, because the ideology of the 
liberal provisional regime was at the moment in accord with our own gospel of 
democracy, because the new government promised to prosecute the war on which 
we were on the verge of embarking, recognition was immediately forthcoming … 
On the basis of the Provisional Government’s coherence with our canons of 
democratic legitimism, permission was given within twelve hours … recognition 
was thus … based on approval of the political doctrine of the incoming regime.212  
 
This brief second interlude in hostility between America and Russia signified common national 
interests, although it lasted only as long as the administration which parroted the prevailing 
political ideology and democratic doctrine of the Allied and Associated Powers.  
Power is the basic function which formulates a state’s perception of another’s material 
abilities; a balance of power therefore implies much more than a mere equilibrium of force, but a 
sustainment of international order via underlying perceptual consensus – a veritable “silent 
compact.”213 During war states are generally obligated to display force, yet in peace they bestow 
confidence in prestige – not necessarily on power in and of itself, but a meticulously constructed 
reputation of power – generally tied to an enforceable document.214 Thus, the U.S. – Soviet 
agreement was unique in that it is not directly tied to a political treaty with which to elucidate its 
legitimacy. It actually possessed stipulations plagiarized in large portions from prior treaties, and 
generally followed the blueprint of earlier settlements between the Soviets and other capitalist 
states. Significantly, the term “recognition” was never expressly mentioned; its only inclusion 
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occurred in a 16 November collateral document sent by Acting Secretary of State Phillips to 
Serge Ughet (the Kerensky regime’s residuary legatee) which referred to “the recognition of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the Government of the United States.” 215 Incidentally, no 
specification was given in this note as to when it occurred. 
The western hemisphere withheld recognition much more often than its European 
counterparts during the nineteenth century. The extension of suffrage to large portions of the 
public – combined with the proliferation of mass markets – integrated previously 
underrepresented populations and forestalled their consciousness regarding economic and 
political power. A substantial portion of their number were disillusioned, hardened veterans of 
the First World War who risked life and limb for statesmen’s follies, and possessed minimal trust 
in social values or politicians. As a result, interwar European politics were initiated with large 
quantities of passive non-recognition policies based upon intensive disgust for Russia’s 
Bolshevik government. These measures were intended to consummate an active damming-up of 
this revolutionary administration, and while the majority of European states formally recognized 
the Soviet Union by 1925, the vehemence with which the international landscape viewed them 
continued for at least another decade. Multiple U.S. executive administrations bore this grudge, 
specifically Wilson’s emphasis on constitutional propriety, and Harding and Coolidge’s 
respective insistence on melding constitutionalism with protecting American material interests. 
This preconception dominated President Wilson’s decision-making for the remainder of 
his administration, and steeled his previously affable outlook toward the Soviets into implacable 
opposition in accordance with his uniquely liberalistic doctrine of constitutional legitimism. An 
impenetrably corrosive barrier thus formed regarding the Bolsheviks and potential negotiations, 
                                                 




which generated a deep-seated double standard within American foreign policy in tandem with 
Wilsonianism. Wilson may have broken with precedence by not diplomatically acknowledging 
foreign governments which controlled a given state, but it was Secretary of State Colby who 
carried it a step further by arguing recognition consisted of more than a neutral act precisely 
because it involved the extension of moral approval to the respective government. Colby 
vehemently argued the Soviets did not merit such support because of how they obtained power, 
and because he postulated they maintained their power through “savage oppression” – an 
allegation put forth well before Stalin’s rule calcified in 1928.216 The unsatisfactory position 
occupied by the U.S. with respect to Russia personified the violation of a fundamental principle 
in international relations:     
when a revolutionary party succeeds in capturing a State, the new government 
will presumably be recognized by foreign powers when it has demonstrated its 
orderly control of the area it occupies and its ability and readiness to carry out its 
international obligations … [however,] the established principles for a nation’s 
recognizing successful revolters in a foreign State as its government certainly 
called for an exception when those revolters were known to be contriving the 
destruction of the very nation that was being asked to recognize them.217  
 
The Bolsheviks’ “original sin” was thus their violent ascension to power, and was therefore 
hypocritically judged from the dictates of strict constitutionalism as an illegal entity by the U.S. 
State Department in February 1918.218 This fact cannot be overstated when analyzing the 
complex circumstances undergirding recognition efforts, and the exceedingly pervasive 
influences it was forced to reckon with in order to bear fruit. 
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Colby’s other prerequisites were termination of the Kremlin’s continued revolutionary 
rhetoric, and Moscow’s failure to satisfy its international obligations particularly the refusal to 
acknowledge the financial responsibilities incurred by prior Russian governments. The latter 
charge was particularly emphasized, and while Washington eventually shed this shortsighted 
characterization of Bolshevik welching, policymakers retained a staunch non-recognition policy 
until their subsequent 1933 ouster. The Soviets rightly argued these debts were not legitimately 
incurred by them, but were instead the responsibility of the very governments they abandoned 
and overthrew. Dominated by ideology, the Kremlin was convinced capitalist greed would allow 
the west to forgo compensation in order to access Russia’s potentially lucrative markets. The 
Bolsheviks purposefully sought out this affiliation in hopes it would elicit a relationship with a 
forthcoming anti-communist coalition of powerful capitalist states who would provide technical 
and economic assistance as the Soviet Union transformed into a formidable industrial and 
military power. Little wonder then, that recognition’s long-delayed bestowal was championed by 
both states as the initiation of a profitable relationship anchored on the pretext of Russia’s unique 
demand for goods and services in an international market crestfallen by the most disastrous 
economic crisis in modern history. The New Deal’s favorable impact on the U.S. economy was 
not a foregone conclusion in 1933, and not only exceeded the expectations and imaginations of 
nearly everyone – except Marxist propagandists – but was never dependent solely on increased 
U.S. – Soviet trade. As such, the most formidable pressure exerted on Washington to effect 
reconciliation came from U.S. business interests frustrated by commercial barriers imposed by 
non-recognition, and anxious to take advantage of opportunities in red Russia. To a certain extent 
then, the Soviets were correct regarding America’s economic interests. The Bolshevik leadership 
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hedged its bets, however, and consequentially forfeited a beneficial trade relationship in the 
interim, and permanently compromised Russian national security.  
America’s conversely insular perspective was driven by an overriding concern for its 
population’s domestic prosperity. Recognition’s diplomatic ramifications were thus generally 
relegated to secondary importance within the U.S., however, Moscow considered rapprochement 
a significant diplomatic triumph which directly impacted international anxieties, especially 
concern over Far Eastern developments. The Kremlin therefore employed the lure of trade in 
their appeals for recognition, although principally because of its beneficial impact on American 
public opinion. Roosevelt’s most likely reason for recognizing Moscow was understood to be 
conventional realpolitik estimations, hence diplomatic recognition’s delay until 1934 or 1935 
would still have constituted a very real warning to both Germany and Japan. When placed in the 
context of larger international concerns the dual threat of Germany and Japan were not of equal 
weight to the Soviet Union and United States in 1933. Obviously, geography was the primary 
catalyst in Soviet – German affairs which never cast the same shadow over relations between 
Germany and the United States. Likewise, Japan “represented an immediate menace to Soviet 
security in eastern Siberia,” yet little more than a distant threat to Pacific American holdings.219 
Accordingly, geostrategic considerations within central and eastern Europe placed America in a 
beneficial position to negotiate favorable terms between Germany and the Soviet Union, and 
accommodated increased U.S. ethical discretion in the meantime.  
While recognition occurred with a single act – all in one day – its implementation, 
however, was a continually evolving development over several decades. Roosevelt gave Litvinov 
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the impression the recognition agreements were designed merely to appease public opinion, and 
therefore increased the Kremlin’s likelihood of ignoring them. While recognition may have been 
withheld until the Soviets promised to repay their debt or paid a portion of it in good faith, no 
agreement requiring the suspension of the Comintern’s operations for a specific time period 
would have been taken seriously by Moscow. FDR similarly caused Litvinov to expect U.S. – 
Soviet cooperation against Japan, although his administration had neither the confirmed support 
of Congress nor the State Department for any successive steps beyond formal recognition. The 
latter agency merely viewed the arrangement as a necessary test of Moscow’s willingness to 
establish normal relations with the United States. De jure recognition was thus consummated 
with the formal exchange of notes between Roosevelt and Litvinov, and every other undertaking 
– although they occurred on the same date – were signed subsequent to this exchange of letters. 
As such, the Soviet government rightly alleged the agreement’s implied endeavors were actually 
reached after formal recognition’s official bestowal, and also allude to multiple instances of U.S. 
unofficial correspondence which could be deemed de facto recognition. Due to the convoluted 
nature of the agreement’s solidification, however, it is also equally possible for U.S. 
representatives to maintain the recorded ventures were reached prior to recognition. While 
turnabout is fair play within international relations, this illustrates face-saving was equally and 
simultaneously vital to both Moscow and Washington. Litvinov also overplayed his hand, giving 
the president and his advisors a finite impression that the Soviets intended to provide partial 
payment of its debts, and curtail its interference in U.S. domestic affairs. Obviously, the 
immediate future of U.S. – Soviet relations depended on how these initial misunderstandings 
between both parties would be deciphered and managed.    
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The president possesses the exclusive power to determine which foreign nations the U.S. 
formally recognizes within state-to-state interactions and the privileged authority to “speak with 
one voice for the nation.”220 The ability to ascertain a government’s suitability and bestow 
recognition deposited in the executive branch therefore reveals the president not only makes the 
initial diplomatic recognition determination, but its office also maintains “that determination in 
his and his agent’s statements.”221 Additionally, the sweeping 1936 decision in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation stated the president acts as “the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations.”222 The overarching tragedy of the recognition 
issue is thus Roosevelt’s overstatement of the expected results which would potentially flow 
forth from recognition’s establishment. Among all the executives and secretaries of state 
discussed, FDR alone perceived recognition from a viewpoint that a staunch policy of 
nonrecognition was ridiculous in light of the Soviet state’s survival, and this rationale alone was 
sufficient for reversing Wilson’s errant original policy. FDR’s high hopes for 1933 established a 
fatal flaw which metastasized into subsequent U.S. – Soviet relations, forever colored by initial 
expectations and their failure to occur. Both states made promises in order to obtain a favorable 
result during the recognition negotiations yet Litvinov’s offerings – perceived as the “price of 
recognition” – far exceeded his host’s, although it is without question U.S. recognition increased 
Moscow’s self-confidence.223 Present during the beginning of this diplomatic waltz, Louis Wehle 
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postulated “imagination in a democracy seldom seems equal to visualizing, and providing 
against, the destructive power of adverse forces – an old truth for the philosophy of history.”224 
A uniquely distinctive ingredient was infused into U.S. political pragmatism by 1932 
when the general public began regarding the Soviet Union as the model for experimental 
methods of social practice. The very conception of social experimentation via planned human 
intervention into social processes with the aim of increasing the peoples’ welfare was indelibly 
linked to the Soviet Union in the minds of America’s leaders and intellectuals. The continual 
parade of sojourners throughout the Soviet Union during the interwar period aided in this 
transformation of American thought, and their published findings were far more impactful on the 
American political consciousness than any foreign influence. The experimental philosophical 
pragmatism which characterized the New Deal from its inception thusly signified an elemental 
readiness to harness varying hypotheses, and an implied readiness to experiment with 
challenging alternatives. To accommodate this shift in social consciousness, the Roosevelt 
administration paradoxically subsumed Wilsonian doctrine and added a revolutionary flair which 
produced the “pseudoprofound theory of convergence.” This hypothesis perpetuated the myth 
that the United States and Soviet Russia were on convergent paths which resulted in the former’s 
transition from laissez-faire capitalism to welfare state socialism, and the latter’s steady 
evolution from authoritarianism to social democracy. 225 In light of unfettered individualism’s 
impact on national interests the Great Depression’s occurrence indicated democratic capitalism 
was anachronistic; democratic socialism appeared to be the answer in order to expand the 
government’s role in halting unrestrained capitalism’s excesses, and not only redistribute wealth, 
                                                 
224 Wehle, 122. 
 
225 Dunn, 5. 
94 
 
but guarantee the social well-being of the state as a whole. Additionally, the 1917 Bolshevik 
Revolution appeared to indicate the crusade toward socialism was part of an inevitable 
worldwide campaign, and merely another phase in the advance toward societal progression 
foreshadowed by the French and American enlightenment-influenced revolutions. American 
social thought thus contained the enduring notion of the experimental collective reconstruction of 
society under the guise of “economic planning,” a term installed into the lexicon of American 
language owing to its rapidly gained credence and adherents.  
Not unsurprisingly, FDR’s adherents perceived Stalin to be representative of his people 
and were earnestly compelled to dispel evidence to the contrary and excused the Georgian 
mastermind’s extreme machinations. Thus Soviet expansion in northeast Asia and Eastern 
Europe were tolerated because the west postulated that such maturation advanced collective 
security and democracy. This influenced Roosevelt’s conviction (along with the multitude of 
other 1930s western intellectuals), that the Soviet Union was no longer a revolutionary actor, but 
an – albeit insecure and suspicious – traditional state power. According to this twisted logic, 
Stalin was no genocidal monster dedicated to the inevitability of revolutionary politics and the 
fomentation of revolution abroad, but an evolving statesman tasked with making difficult 
decisions of a defensive nature in order to protect and industrialize his nation. This hypocritical 
infusion of debilitating moral relativism into U.S. foreign policy allowed Roosevelt to determine 
Stalin was a versatile democrat, and an essential ally in constructing his new world order. 
Implementing this double standard required the Roosevelt apparatus to mislead public opinion 
and circumvent State Department professionals while courting Stalin, such as informal 
interactions within the larger 1933 Wheat Conference which provided the first opportunity for 
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American and Soviet diplomats to speak with each other following Roosevelt’s ascendance to 
the Oval Office.226  
In actuality, neither international stability nor trade received a significant boost from 
recognition’s implementation. While this event was certainly an act of monumental importance, 
FDR’s cautious handling of the issue arose less from public concern or resistance for 
international consequences than his prevailing inclination to creep through foreign affairs with a 
fervent desire for unequivocal consensus. Secretary Hull believed the Kremlin was so eager for 
validation Washington could name any price, and although this exaggerated assumption later 
proved false, Roosevelt’s administration acted upon it to levy pressure on Litvinov. Had they 
carried it through to a logical conclusion, perhaps the U.S. would have stopped turning a blind 
eye to the horrific side effects of Stalin’s Five Year Plans, specifically collectivization efforts in 
Ukraine. By concentrating on secondary issues such as the repayment of debts, religious rights of 
Americans in Russia, and the Comintern’s meddlesome activities, FDR’s administrative 
apparatus approached being a passive accomplice to Stalin’s Holodomor; U.S. diplomatic 
representatives should have raised the issue of Ukraine’s man-made famine with Litvinov, and 
made a gesture to aid in its recovery.227 Whatever the possible successful outcome of historical 
hindsight, Sergei Kirov’s December 1934 assassination and its initiation of subsequent purges – 
directly facilitated on Stalin’s orders, and exacerbated at his behest – definitively ended the 
honeymoon between the U.S. and Soviet Union.228 Rambunctious Litvinov eventually survived 
this viciously abhorrent bloodletting which ravaged the 1930s, although Molotov later chillingly 
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admitted of his predecessor, “It was only by chance that he remained among the living.”229 
Fortunately for Litvinov he did not succumb to an arranged road accident, a fate which befell 
more than one old-guard Bolshevik during this period; he may never have known how close he 
came to no longer being considered an “honest revolutionary” by the vozhd.230      
 With recognition successful won, Roosevelt set about building a State Department 
infrastructure to ensure his carefully procured prize was safely guarded by trusted 
representatives. William C. Bullitt was the logical choice as first ambassador to the Soviet Union 
precisely because of his relationship with FDR, obvious familiarity with the recent negotiations, 
and enthusiasm for friendly relations between the two states. Secretary Hull accepted the 
decision in light of friction between his office and the White House, and the realization that 
Bullitt’s posting would be a better alternative than his continued presence in Washington.231 
Bullitt’s infectious enthusiasm however quickly turned to thorough disillusionment regarding the 
optimism he harbored for the Soviet Union’s possibilities – a seed planted deeply when it and he 
were young – once he learned of extensive subversion taking place within U.S. borders in the 
Soviets’ name. The new ambassador realized that although an overriding condition of 
recognition had been the Comintern’s pledge of refraining from all domestic activities which 
occurred inside the U.S., and foreign activities aimed specifically at American institutions, it had 
been little more than a red herring. The Soviets never had any intention of following-through 
with its implementation.232 As events later proved, Bullitt’s appointment to the Russian embassy 
was unfortunately not ideal due to the nature of his personality and emotional attachments, which 
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caused him to be particularly susceptible to disappointment. After all, he had known Lenin and 
other key Bolshevik leaders personally, and “needed to be liked.”233 
The fundamental reason for America’s non-recognition policy prior to 1933 may have 
been “the irreconcilability of the revolutionary Communistic theory and practice of government 
with the theory and practice of American democracy and capitalism,” Yet every modern century 
distinguished a specific state to which it looked as its conscience-model. 234 For fifteen years 
following the October Revolution, the Soviet Union fulfilled this role for many of the world’s 
intellectuals, equipped with a philosophy engendered by reports of travelers rendered in the 
language of American pragmatism and experience. Ideological intellectuals (social workers, 
social scientists, writers), however, were much more selective in their perceptions and submitted 
flowery reports skewed by surface level observations, free of the inner tension which personified 
Russian Marxism’s unimaginable technical incompetence. Further, these idealists grossly 
underestimated Stalinism’s perverse nature and preserved a blind spot for the Soviet secret 
police, choosing instead to focus on the inner liberation of Soviet energy and potential 
humanistic, democratic developments. Conversely, the Bolsheviks essentially nationalized 
Marxism-Leninism and lent their efforts to calcifying Stalinism which converted Russia into the 
Soviet Union’s nation-state, championed Socialism in One Country, and instituted the New 
Economic Policy. As a result, a growing body of literature challenged the “totalitarian” 
conception of Stalin’s reign, and suggested the formation and implementation of Soviet foreign 
policy shared many of America’s same policy making complexities. Its publication demands 
historians consider the juxtaposition of U.S. foreign policy related to Soviet foreign policy, and 
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vice versa. This important relationship loomed over the cold war’s historiographical issues, and 
the literal chronological interactions between these eventually dynamic, symbiotic super powers. 
Obviously the institutional miasma of bureaucracy is composed of impactful individuals, 
however, understanding how and why these agencies behave is paramount to ascertaining how 
and why their individual membership behaves. Likewise, their demeanor is not merely 
contingent upon their institutional mission, but equally derived from two parallel yet differing 
areas: ideology and psychology.  
The degree of Roosevelt’s persuasiveness is readily evident, and explained by Litvinov’s 
prior obduracy advanced by Hull and Bullitt. To the distress of historians, FDR rarely generated 
memoranda of conversations, thus no record exists of his dialogue with Litvinov whereupon he 
masterfully deployed nonviolent settlement to facilitate successful negotiations aligned 
according to national advantage. Minor textual changes to the finished recognition agreement 
suggested the extent the president was involved in satisfying his own goals to the detriment of 
his guest’s demands. Once again the importance of individuals to history became extremely 
relevant when assessing the tragic consequences of this episode in U.S. – Soviet relations, due to 
the long term consequences put into play by men charged with securing its conception. Each 
personage involved attached passionate importance to their respective state and subscribed 
allegiance to its prosperity, as if to a beloved. Decisions during the interwar period therefore 
occurred according to a distinct battle rhythm the cadence of which echoed throughout the 
international community, and were all too soon drowned out by the drums of war. Roosevelt, 
Stalin, Bullitt, and Litvinov all sought the same overarching goal – the solidification of a 
successful legacy for their people – although each set about his crusade according to vastly 
different methods the results of which impacted our world today in strikingly prescient ways. 
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Diplomacy and tragedy are thus the hallmarks of this thesis. Before the advent of mutually-
assured-destruction came the age of mutually-assured-benefit to Russia and the United States. Its 
implementation unfortunately fell far short of the “purposes of prestige” with which it was 
originally established and negotiated, yet succinctly fastened the events depicted within as 
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